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THROW AWAY THE KEY, OR THE KEY HOLDER? 
COERCIVE CONTEMPT FOR LOST OR 
FORGOTTEN CRYPTOCURRENCY PRIVATE 
KEYS, OR OBSTINATE HOLDERS 
Andrew M. Hinkes1 
ABSTRACT—Most cryptoassets natively function as bearer instruments. 
Whoever controls the private key for a given cryptoasset wallet generally 
controls the assets held by that wallet. In a civil or criminal action or as part 
of a governmental investigation, parties may be ordered to disclose their 
private keys or to transfer cryptoassets controlled by those private keys. 
However, people forget things and lose things, including extremely 
important things. Parties may lose private keys, and thereby lose control of 
their assets; parties acting in bad faith, or due to ideological motivation, 
may claim that “lost” or “forgotten” private keys prevent them from 
complying with disclosure or turnover orders. Determining whether claims 
of lost or forgotten private keys are genuine or are bad faith attempts to 
protect assets will be a challenge for courts, forcing them to confront 
complex, technology-specific evidence and requiring that they determine 
whether that loss is bona fide or tactical “self-created impossibility.” Courts 
may likewise find that traditional contempt sanctions are insufficient to 
compel a motivated contemnor to comply with disclosure or turnover 
orders. To avoid expensive, time-consuming evidentiary hearings on 
contempt, parties and courts should consider ex ante measures, including 
standing orders and injunctive relief that would require disclosure of and 
prevent the loss of private keys once financial condition becomes relevant 
to any claim or defense in litigation. Legislators could create novel 
contempt sanctions that leverage the unique features of cryptoassets to lien 
sufficiently identifiable cryptoassets at issue. New laws could create 
registries listing identifiable cryptoassets subject to turnover orders (similar 
 
 1 Andrew M. Hinkes is an Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University School of Law, New 
York University Stern School of Business; J.D., University of Miami School of Law, A.B. (History), 
Washington University in St. Louis. My thanks to David Yermack, Max Raskin, Peter Van 
Valkenburgh, Jerry Brito, Darren Sandler, Nelson “Romero” Rosario, Addison Cameron-Huff, Marco 
Dell’Erba, Chris DeRose, Joshua Unseth, Editor-in-Chief Anne Monjar, the staff and hardworking 
students with the Northwestern University Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, and to 
Michelle Hinkes for her infinite patience, encouragement, support, and love. Any errors, mistakes, 
omissions, or misapprehensions found herein are my own. 
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to state UCC registries), use the infrastructure and legal obligations 
imposed upon regulated intermediaries by the Bank Secrecy Act and Office 
of Foreign Asset Controls, or modify existing state law writs to direct state-
regulated financial intermediaries to seize those identifiable cryptoassets 
pending further court order. Although these new sanctions would destroy 
the fungibility of the cryptoassets at issue and reduce their commercial 
value, they would also create new, efficient incentives. The lien against 
identifiable cryptoassets would have no impact on parties who actually lose 
their private key but would facilitate recovery of cryptoassets taken without 
authorization in a hack or theft. Finally, the threat of a lien that would 
adversely impact the value of the specific implicated cryptoassets would 
reduce the incentive for a bad faith contemnor to defy a turnover order and 
instead encourage compliance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The financial and legal worlds have struggled to adapt to the sudden 
popularity of cryptoassets like Bitcoin and Ethereum.2 Although much of 
the legal concern created by cryptoassets has focused on the implications of 
their sale, trading, and use for fundraising, cryptoassets are now widely 
held and will inevitably challenge certain procedural aspects of the 
traditional justice system as a result of their eccentricities in form and 
function. 
Cryptoassets are generally digital instruments created and transacted 
by software operated on a decentralized network of computers that are 
designed to remove legally accountable intermediaries from transactions 
between system participants.3 This distributed structure complicates, but 
does not prevent, the exercise of power over those assets by courts.4 
Cryptoasset owners control their assets via cryptographically-generated 
credentials known as private keys that are typically kept secret.5 Although a 
range of technologies exists to back up private keys, if a private key is not 
backed up and is subsequently forgotten, lost, or stolen, a cryptoasset 
owner may irrevocably lose control of his cryptoassets, which may include 
irreplaceable, unique, non-fungible assets. 
 
 2 Although there is significant variety in the functionality, intended purpose, legal classification, 
and distribution model of various cryptoassets, “cryptoassets” will be used herein to refer to all varieties 
of cryptoasset systems that use public/private key encryption to control those underlying assets, unless a 
meaningful distinction calls for the use of a more specific term. 
 3 SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM 1 (2008), 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PAA-PQ9E] (“What is needed is an electronic 
payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to 
transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third party.”) 
 4 In particular, the SEC has taken a technology agnostic approach in a variety of its settlement 
agreements related to the cryptoasset ecosystem. See generally In re Zachary Coburn, File Release No. 
3-18888 at 3 (Sec. Exch. Release No. 84553 (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/2018/34-84553.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KFT-UD2V])(finding the technical structure of 
a smart contract running on the Ethereum blockchain immaterial to the conclusion that the system was 
an unregistered securities exchange); Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Sec. 
Exch. Act of 1934: The Dao, Release No. 81207 at 1, 11 (Sec. Exch. Comm’n. 81207 (July 25, 2017), 
available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FL5-L2VQ]) 
(holding that the decentralized structure of unregistered, unexempted offering of investment contracts 
did not impact the analysis under the Howey test or its conclusion that Dao Tokens sold were an 
improper unregistered securities offering). 
 5 Laurent Sacharoff, Unlocking the Fifth Amendment: Passwords and Encrypted Devices, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 203, 239 (2018) (“A person who owns or possesses Bitcoin controls it with a long, 
complex encryption key . . . “) Most private keys used are summary or compressed versions of private 
keys. See infra note 120 (“A person ultimately controls their Bitcoin or other cryptocurrency by way of 
a much longer private key.”). See generally Private Key, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/
Private_key [https://perma.cc/S8DA-TZMD]. 
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These novel features complicate the exercise of power by courts to 
compel disclosure of private keys, enforce cryptoasset turnover orders, or 
attach or execute against cryptoassets.6 Courts should understand how users 
control their cryptoassets to appropriately identify situations where parties 
have, in good faith, lost their private keys,7 and situations where users lie 
about lost private keys or intentionally “lose” their private keys to render 
compliance with turnover orders impossible, and to craft appropriate 
sanctions for each case. Courts should understand what evidence 
constitutes “all reasonable efforts to comply”8 with a turnover order and 
what evidence supports a legal conclusion of bad faith self-created 
impossibility. 
Courts use coercive contempt sanctions to compel compliance with 
their orders if compliance is possible or if compliance is rendered 
impossible by the actions of the party charged with compliance. These 
sanctions may include indefinite incarceration. However, given the ease by 
which a private key may be secreted, even the harsh sanction of 
incarceration may be insufficient to convince a truly motivated contemnor 
to comply with a court order. Incarceration may be insignificant if a fortune 
in safely secured assets awaits after a contemnor’s inevitable release. 
Likewise, cryptoasset holders may resist or invent complicated technical 
excuses to ignore a turnover order based upon an ideological belief that 
cryptoassets should be self-sovereign and coercion-resistant. Moreover, a 
party may invoke the Fifth Amendment, thereby introducing complicated 
constitutional issues, as a defense to turnover orders; depending on the 
specific requirements of the turnover order, compliance may be considered 
to be a testimonial act. These assertions may protect the private key holder 
where the order requires the turnover of a private key to evidence the key 
holder’s legal culpability, or where the private key itself is to be discovered 
but should not prevent a court from compelling a user to use (as opposed to 
disclose) their private key to effectuate a transfer of cryptoassets. 
However, it is unlikely that sanctioning a contemnor will result in the 
regeneration or re-discovery of a truly lost private key. Courts instead 
should embrace a two-part strategy; first, they should act to prevent private 
 
 6 Court orders that require a party to turn over a private key or to turn over assets controlled by a 
private key will be referred to herein as “turnover orders” unless there is a material distinction in the 
type of order, for which a more specific term will be used. 
 7 See Joseph Young, How a Cryptocurrency Investor Lost $60 Million in Bitcoin and Never Got it 
Back, CCN (May 27, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/how-a-cryptocurrency-investor-lost-60-million-in-
bitcoin-and-never-got-it-back/ [https://perma.cc/6FJH-BUYF] (recounting the plight of Jesse Howells 
who lost 7500 bitcoins by throwing away the thumb drive holding his private keys). 
 8 See infra notes 113–14. 
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key loss, and second, they should impose new sanctions tailored to the 
specific control issues associated with cryptoassets. 
Courts could enter injunctions requiring private key holders to escrow 
a backup of their private keys with their counsel or with third parties once 
the private key or cryptoassets controlled thereby are at issue in litigation. 
Courts could also introduce standing orders requiring preservation of 
private keys at the commencement of an action implicating asset discovery 
or when cryptoassets become at issue in litigation. 
Even these proactive measures, however, cannot prevent claims of lost 
keys. Courts should address these novel assets with novel expressions of 
existing court power. The focus of these contempt sanctions should shift 
from coercing compliance by the contemnor to acting directly upon the 
cryptoassets at issue. Courts should leverage the blockchain public ledger 
maintained by cryptoasset systems and the ability to identify cryptoassets 
associated with the contemnor to impose a new kind of lien against 
identifiable cryptoassets subject to a turnover order that may cause those 
cryptoassets to be seized or frozen when transacted through regulated 
intermediaries. State or federal regulators could create new registries that 
would put transacting parties and intermediaries on notice of the lien 
against those cryptoassets and require regulated money transmitters to 
identify and seize transactions of those cryptoassets. New laws could 
likewise criminalize transactions of those liened cryptoassets. 
Alternatively, states may create new writs of attachment and facilitate 
service of these writs upon state-regulated money transmitters through a 
state regulator, which would compel all regulated entities to seize 
transactions of liened cryptoassets pending further court order. These 
strategies would not harm a party who actually lost their private keys, but 
would disincentivize contemnors from acting in bad faith to tactically claim 
private key loss and potentially may enable the recovery of stolen 
cryptoassets. These new contempt sanctions would efficiently and 
effectively use rebalanced incentives to accomplish the goal of contempt: 
to encourage compliance with the court’s order. 
Part I of this article will discuss the unique attributes of possession 
and ownership of cryptoassets, including wallets, keys, and the mechanics 
of cryptoasset transactions. Part II will discuss the use of coercive contempt 
in the context of orders requiring the production of private keys and 
turnover of cryptoassets. Part III will address problems in the use of 
traditional contempt sanctions to compel compliance with turnover orders. 
Finally, Part IV will discuss new proactive measures and novel contempt 
sanctions to compel the production of cryptoassets. 
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I. WALLET SOFTWARE AND KEYS 
Wallets9 are software created by third parties or the developer(s) of a 
given cryptoasset system that allow users to control credentials used to 
transfer assets created by that system to other users.10 Keys are lengthy 
strings of numbers reduced by algorithms to strings of numbers and letters 
generated by the cryptoasset wallet software that allow users to direct 
transactions of assets on that cryptoasset system.11 Cryptoasset private keys 
are randomly generated by the wallet software executing a cryptographic 
hash function against a randomly generated number.12 Public keys, 
sometimes called public addresses, are generated by wallet software by 
executing a cryptographic hash function against the private key.13 Public 
keys are displayed on the system’s blockchain, i.e. a public ledger that 
records transactions between users, but information linking a given 
transaction to an identifiable person or entity is generally hidden or not 
provided.14 Private keys allow their holder to “sign” transactions to 
“spend,” i.e. authorize transactions of cryptoassets.15 Initiation of a 
transaction is evidence of the party’s use, knowledge, and control (although 
perhaps not exclusive control) of the private key at that time. That a 
transaction has occurred, however, does not evidence the identity of the 
person who controls that private key, unless the public key associated with 
that private key is publicly known to belong to a given person or entity, and 
is known to be in that person or entity’s exclusive control at the time of that 
 
 9 This paper will focus upon public distributed blockchain systems, using Bitcoin as the primary 
example. These systems are distributed and generally lack a central point of control. Private or 
permissioned blockchains generally have a central administrator who will respond to court process and 
thus many of the issues detailed herein do not apply to assets on those private or permissioned systems. 
 10 See generally Wallet, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Wallet [https://perma.cc/7772-
HGLC]. See also Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Certain Business Models 
Involving Convertible Virtual Currencies, FIN-2019-G001, at p. 15 https://www.fincen.gov/sites/ 
default/files/2019-05/FinCEN%20Guidance%20CVC%20FINAL%20508.pdf)(“[Convertible virtual 
currency] wallets are interfaces for storing and transferring [convertible virtual 
currencies].”)[https://perma.cc/3F98-GY22]. 
 11 See generally Private Key, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Private_key 
[https://perma.cc/S25N-762T]. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Address, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Address [https://perma.cc/WFJ2-RHTK]. 
 14 NAKAMOTO, supra note 3, at 6. 
 15 Id. at 2 (“Each owner transfers the coin to the next by digitally signing a hash of the previous 
transaction and the public key of the next owner and adding these to the end of the coin.”). Signing the 
transfer submits the proposed transaction to the miners who will verify the transaction. See Mauro 
Conti, et al., A Survey on Security and Privacy Issues of Bitcoin, 20 IEEE COMM. SURV. TUTORIALS 
3416, 3418 (2018) http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8369416&isnumber= 
8540503 [https://perma.cc/C2JK-GQMR]. This verification by miners records the transaction on the 
blockchain and causes the value at issue in the transaction to be recorded as transferred from transferor 
to transferee. 
16:225 (2019) Throw Away the Key, or the Key Holder? 
231 
transaction. Because transactions of cryptoassets are generally immediate 
and irrevocable, users hold their private keys confidential.16 Any person 
who controls a private key can access and control the assets associated 
therewith; a thief who steals a private key may immediately transfer the 
assets controlled by that private key to another wallet.17 
Although a user-to-user transaction is recorded on the system’s 
blockchain, a user may transfer cryptoassets controlled by a given wallet by 
communicating her private key to another user.18 Such a transfer does not 
appear on a blockchain or otherwise create any record or “paper trail.” 
Although possession of a private key is control of the assets associated with 
that wallet,19 mere possession is not equivalent to ownership of those 
assets; a party may possess a private key but lack legal title or “the best 
claim” to the assets controlled by that private key.20 This may occur when a 
private key is stolen, when cryptoassets are subject to liens, or when a party 
holds one of several private keys in a multi-signature configuration wallet. 
A. Types of Wallets 
Cryptoasset wallets vary among their features and physical form. The 
most common types of wallets are digital, externalized, third-party-hosted, 
brain wallet/incorporeal, and multiple signature wallets. 
 
 16 See, e.g., ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN: UNLOCKING DIGITAL 
CRYPTOCURRENCIES 41 (2014) (“In simple terms, a transaction tells the network that the owner of a 
number of bitcoins has authorized the transfer of some of those bitcoins to another owner. The new 
owner can now spend these bitcoins by creating another transaction that authorizes transfer to another 
owner, and so on, in a chain of ownership.”). Nakamoto recommends using new public and private keys 
for each transaction to provide additional identity protection. NAKAMOTO, supra note 3, at 6 (“As an 
additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them from being linked 
to a common owner.”). 
 17 Under those circumstances, if the user who suffered the loss can identify the thief, that user still 
has limited recourse; they may ask nicely, use self-help, file a police report, or seek civil monetary 
relief, but cannot by any system operation reclaim those assets. See generally Timothy B. Lee, Lawsuit 
Illustrates Bitcoin’s Chargeback Problem, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 7, 2012), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/03/lawsuit-illustrates-bitcoins-chargeback-problem [https://perma.cc/46SP-NHJ4]. 
 18 The author expects that this means of conveying value will be most often used by parties seeking 
to transfer assets without detection. 
 19 To “hold a private key” has been defined in multiple states’ Digital Signature Acts to mean “to 
be authorized to utilize a private key.” See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 325K.01(14) (2018). This definition is 
not universal, and it addresses authority to use the key without explicitly addressing the ownership of 
the underlying data associated with the private key. 
 20 Although possession of private keys is generally conflated with ownership, ownership is a 
function of legal title, not mere control. Byrne has suggested that cryptocurrency system assets could be 
viewed as a matter of contract rights among participants in those networks or as an asset for which title 
exists. Preston Byrne, What Do You Legally “Own” with Bitcoin? A Short Introduction to Krypto-
property, PRESTON BYRNE (Nov. 23, 2018), https://prestonbyrne.com/2018/11/23/what-do-you-legally-
own-with-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/B9MA-994X]. Case law supports claims of ownership over pure 
information. See, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 216 (1918). 
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A typical cryptoasset wallet is software that is downloaded and 
installed on an internet-connected computer. Users access their cryptoassets 
by inputting their private key or a password derived from that private key 
into the wallet software. Users may use any software wallet compatible 
with the cryptoasset system at issue; in most cases access is not device or 
software instance reliant. 
Externalized wallets are physical or virtual objects that include a 
private key written, engraved, saved, embedded, or otherwise represented 
exclusively in that object. These vary in form from writing on paper,21 to 
instruments that resemble currency,22 to art,23 to external computer storage 
devices.24 Typically the private key is not otherwise saved, and the private 
key stored in or on the externalized wallet must be input into software to 
access the cryptoassets controlled thereby. “Hardware wallets” are external 
storage devices that hold the private key and require the user to connect the 
device to an internet-connected computer, and then to input a saved access 
credential into software to access the cryptoassets associated with the 
stored private key.25 
Specialized key structures, known as multiple signature or “multisig” 
wallets,26 split the private key into N sub-keys where some subset M of N 
keys are required to spend cryptoassets controlled by that wallet.27 Multisig 
wallets are often used when cryptoasset ownership or control is intended to 
be shared, to secure cryptoassets by holding multiple sub-private keys in 
 
 21 Paper Wallet, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Paper_wallet [https://perma.cc/774W-
VCA5]. 
 22 Ariella Brown, What’s a Casascius Coin?, COINDESK (May 9, 2013, 4:14 PM), 
https://www.coindesk.com/whats-a-casascius-coin [https://perma.cc/CPE7-PH8U]. 
 23 Lynx Art Collection (@LynxCollection), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/LynxCollection 
[https://perma.cc/XPZ3-WKJY]. 
 24 Hardware Wallet, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Hardware_wallet [https://perma.cc/
4LLE-J6J4]. 
 25 See id. Examples of hardware wallets include devices sold by Ledger, Trezor, KeepKey. See 
generally Myrto Arapinis, et. al., A 2018, A Formal Treatment of Hardware Wallets in Financial 
Cryptography and Data Security - 23RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, FC (Feb. 18, 2019). Financial 
Cryptography and Data Security 2019, St Kitts, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 18/02/19, (analyzing security 
aspects of multiple hardware wallets). 
 26 ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES 11 (2016). 
 27 See Multisignature, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Multisignature. [https://
perma.cc/2R2B-E2DH]; see also Abigail J. Farmer & Cory Elizabeth Tyszka, Virtual Currency Estate 
Planning, Bit By Bit, 40 ACTEC L.J. 249, 250, 265 (2014), What is Multisig and What Can It Do?, 
COINCENTER, https://coincenter.org/entry/what-is-multi-sig-and-what-can-it-do (last accessed 4/21/19) 
(“A P2SH address can support arbitrary sets of N keys, any M of which are required to transact — this 
is commonly referred to as ‘M-of-N.’”).[ https://perma.cc/QPY7-XH28]. 
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different locations,28 or as a governance tool to prevent unexpected or 
unintended transactions.29 
Online exchanges have contributed to the widespread popularity of 
cryptoassets by allowing 24 hour a day, seven days a week trading of an 
ever-expanding group of cryptoassets in an under-regulated or unregulated 
environment. Although these exchanges are generally used to trade 
cryptoassets, they are frequently misused as a form of simplified remote 
storage.30 There are generally five distinct types of exchanges. First and 
most common are custodial exchanges that commingle their customers’ 
assets in non-differentiated cryptoasset wallets and maintain their own 
records of customer deposit, trading, and withdrawal activity. Customers 
access these exchanges via the Internet using exchange-issued usernames 
and passwords. The legal rights associated with the deposit of cryptoassets 
into these exchanges vary widely, and are usually established by clickwrap 
agreements.31 Customers who store assets on these third party exchanges 
forfeit direct control over their cryptoassets and instead rely on the 
exchange’s operators to protect their cryptoassets from external and 
internal threats.32 The second type of exchange holds its users’ assets in 
user-segregated wallets.33 Some exchanges allow their users to control their 
 
 28 M. Rosenfeld, Comment to What are Multi-Signature Transactions?, STACK EXCHANGE: 
BITCOIN, http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/3718/what-are-multi-signature- 
transactions [https://perma.cc/NVA7-SAPR]. 
 29 Pamela Morgan, Using Multi-Signature Accounts for Corporate Governance, Empowered Law 
(May 2014), https://empoweredlaw.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/multi-signatureaccountsforcorporate
governance1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB99-NML7]. 
 30 This is a terrible idea for a number of reasons. See generally Andrew Hinkes, On Centralized 
Custodial Crypto-currency Exchanges and Other Terrible Ideas, Mmedium (Aug. 6, 2016), 
https://medium.com/@drewhinkes/on-centralized-custodial-crypto-currency-exchanges-and-other-
terrible-ideas-1cb3f9ca5410; [https://perma.cc/7ur7-meqz]; Rachel Wolfson, Why Centralized 




 31 See, e.g., Coinbase User Agreement, https://www.coinbase.com/legal/user_agreement?locale= 
en-US [https://perma.cc/B9LG-WJJR] . 
 32 Sacharoff, supra note 5, at 239 (“Or they will outsource the responsibility to hold onto the keys 
to an institution such as Coinbase and use a password to access their Coinbase account.”). Leaving 
assets on an exchange may be tempting to a user; by relying on a custodian, users can avoid 
downloading and operating a separate instance of wallet software for each asset they own on a machine 
they own and operate, and avoid the need to remember a private key for each type of asset’s wallet 
software. 
 33 Certain crypto asset exchanges that are regulated as options exchanges, such as LedgerX, are 
required to segregate each user’s assets under CFTC regulation. See, e.g., COMM. FUTURES TRADING 
COMM’N, LEDGERX LLC RULES 52, https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/
@otherif/documents/ifdocs/ledgercdcoappa-22017.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD4N-6C3U] (discussing 
segregated customer collateral accounts). 
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cryptoassets using their private keys.34 Certain online exchanges referred to 
as decentralized exchanges35 function like centralized exchanges but 
operate certain parts of their order fulfilment function over a decentralized 
system. These decentralized exchanges may or may not include central 
actors to accept court process.36 However, most online exchanges are 
incorporated businesses37 and are likely to respond to court orders to 
provide user data,38 freeze assets, and to turn over its users’ cryptoassets.39 
Finally, outsourced custody services are offered by companies that hold 
cryptoassets for their customers in exchange for payment pursuant to 
express contracts.40 
“Brain wallets” or incorporeal wallets allow control of cryptoasset 
wallets to be held exclusively in the mind of its owner.41 Brain wallets use 
an algorithm that generates a private key from a password or seed phrase 
 
 34 See, e.g., CRYPTOBRIDGE, http://crypto-bridge.org [https://perma.cc/2Y7G-D5WQ]. 
 35 Lindsay X. Lin, Deconstructing Decentralized Exchanges, STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 
(Jan. 5, 2019), https://stanford-jblp.pubpub.org/pub/deconstructing-dex[https://perma.cc/4D8F-9Z5V]. 
 36 Cf. In re Zachary Coburn, File No. 3-18888 Zachary Coburn, Exch. Act Rel. 84553 (Nov. 8, 
2018) (documenting the SEC’s cease and desist order against Coburn who “controlled” a decentralized 
crypto exchange market which operated as software on a decentralized network of nodes on the 
Ethereum blockchain). 
 37 See BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD, VIRTUAL MARKETS INTEGRITY INITIATIVE REPORT 8 (2018), 
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/vmii_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/J376-9PN4]. 
 38 United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 17-CV-01431-JSC, 2017 WL 5890052, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 28, 2017); Coinbase, supra note 31 (Coinbase reserves the right to refuse to process or cancel any 
pending Digital Currency Transaction as required by law or in response to a subpoena, court order, or 
other binding government order or to enforce transaction limits). 
 39 See Sacharoff, supra note 5, at 239. 
 40 Various strategies have been used to provide custody of cryptoassets as a service. Some vendors, 
such as Xapo, function like banks and will hold assets for third-parties pursuant to express contracts. 
XAPO, http://xapo.com [https://perma.cc/87XV-S974?type=image]. Others like Bitgo provide custody 
through a multisig wallet. BITGO, http://www.bitgo.com [https://perma.cc/YPL3-3CA6]. Finally, trust 
companies like Northern Trust that previously provided custody services for regulated financial 
products have recently offered similar service offerings to custody of cryptoassets. NORTHERN TRUST, 
https://www.northerntrust.com [https://perma.cc/AJW3-Q9BA]. Each of these types of external 
custodians are incorporated entities that will generally respond to court-issued process. The Wyoming 
Legislature recently passed Wyoming Senate File 0125, SEA NO. 0039, which authorizes banks to 
voluntarily provide custodial services for digital assets consistent with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s qualified custodian requirements, effective as of July 1, 2019. See 39 S. Res. 65th Leg., 
Gen.Sess. (Wyo.2019).See also discussion of regulatory burdens associated with the operation of so 
called “hosted wallets” where the hosting wallet has “has total independent control over the value 
(although it is contractually obligated to access the value only on instructions from the owner)” at 
Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Certain Business Models Involving Convertible Virtual 
Currencies, FIN-2019-G001, at p. 15-16, https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/2019-05/FinCEN
%20Guidance%20CVC%20FINAL%20508.pdf [https://perma.cc/3F98-GY22]. 
 41 Max I. Raskin, Realm of the Coin: Bitcoin and Civil Procedure, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
969, 998 (2015). 
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that is memorized by the owner or user.42 The holder of a brain wallet 
password can transfer control of assets by communicating the passphrase to 
another person, which would allow the transferee to regenerate the wallet 
and to access the cryptoassets associated with that private key.43 
Although there are meaningful variations among wallet technologies, 
unless the wallet type used involves a third-party custodian or a physical 
object, a party seeking to obtain turnover of cryptoassets or to establish that 
a given party has control of cryptoassets held in a specific wallet will need 
to obtain the private key from that party. In that sense, most cryptoasset 
wallets are either hosted and controlled by a third party, or function like 
brain wallets. 
B. Automated Transactions of Cryptocurrency 
Certain cryptoasset systems allow users to pre-set transactions to 
occur in the future. Bitcoin, for example, allows users to use nLockTime to 
pre-set transactions to be submitted for verification on a time and date in 
the future.44 These transactions may be valid when set but only become 
effective and cause a transaction to be submitted for verification if there are 
sufficient assets associated with the transferor wallet to fund the intended 
transaction and if the system reaches a given block height or system time.45 
The private key holder is not required to do anything at the time the 
transaction is submitted for verification. 
Smart contracts may also be used to “pre-load” a transaction to be 
executed in the future. The term “smart contract” in this context means 
code that controls a cryptoasset wallet that, depending on external data 
reported to that code, may or may not execute a given transaction.46 This 
allows the smart contract to “break escrow” and transact value to another 
 
 42 Id. at 998 n.215. 
 43 Id. at 998 n.216. (“Because ‘[e]ach owner transfers the coin to the next by digitally signing a 
hash . . . and that digital signature is the passphrase generating the brain wallet.’”); see also, 
NAKAMOTO, supra note 3, at 2. 
 44 nLockTime, BITCOIN WIKI (Feb. 17, 2019, 4:50 PM), https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/NLockTime 
[https://perma.cc/8UQ6-9TRP]; Protocol Documentation, BITCOIN WIKI (Dec. 26, 2018, 3:12 PM), 
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Protocol_documentation#tx [https://perma.cc/J7DV-S8CH]. 
 45 ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES 63 (July 19, 
2016). 
 46 Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public Networks, 2 FIRST MONDAY 
(Sept. 1, 1997), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469-publisher= 
First [https://perma.cc/F3MD-93DF]; A Primer on Smart Contracts, LABCFTC 2, 4 (Nov. 27, 2018), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/2018-11/LabCFTC_PrimerSmartContracts112718.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AES8-CVJX] (“[A] ‘smart contract’ is a set of code . . . [that a]llows self-executing 
computer code to take actions at specified times and/or based on reference to the occurrence or non-
occurrence of an action or event. . . .”). 
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wallet upon the report of the occurrence of some external event.47 
Typically, smart contracts require an intentional transfer of cryptoassets 
into the smart contract wallet but do not require the transferor to sign a 
transaction with that user’s private key when the smart contract itself 
executes and transacts cryptoassets to another public key address.48 Both 
nLockTime transactions and smart contracts may be used to conceal or 
delay a transfer of cryptoassets to a third party.49 
A multisig wallet or smart contract may be configured to create a 
“dead man’s switch,” wherein a smart contract or other software may act as 
a third party that will periodically check if the private key holder is 
“alive,”50 and if not, “throw the switch” and submit a transaction of 
cryptoassets controlled by that wallet to another wallet without the need for 
a human third party’s intervention.51 However, a dead man’s switch may 
fail if the software relied upon also fails, is hacked, or if the underlying 
system is forked.52 A dead man’s switch may be used to passively transact 
cryptoassets in case of “duress” that prevents the settlor of the switch from 
confirming their vitality. 
 
 47 Michael Bacina, When Two Worlds Collide: Smart Contracts and the Australian Legal System, 
21 J. INTERNET L. 15, 19 (2018); Jenny Cieplak & Simon Leefatt, Smart Contracts: A Smart Way to 
Automate Performance, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 417, 423 (2017) (“An oracle is a third-party information 
services provider that will digitally ‘sign’ a transaction, attesting to the occurrence of specific 
conditions.”). For example, a smart contract may cause the transfer of assets upon a specific date or 
upon the reporting of the outcome of a sporting event or political election to that smart contract by an 
oracle. 
 48 It is unclear who “owns” assets held by a smart contract that has not yet executed. It can be 
inferred that each of the potential recipients of the value who may potentially receive that value, 
depending on the report from the oracle, has a contingent right to those assets. 
 49 Consider a smart contract wallet holding 50 bitcoins that were transacted to that smart contract 
wallet public address by A, which smart contract code holds those bitcoins until Oracle 1 reports some 
data X, wherein depending on X, the bitcoin may be transferred to public addresses controlled by either 
A or B. The parties assume that oracle 1 will report data X fairly and truthfully. If A and whoever 
controls oracle 1 conspire, those assets can be held in a smart contract that appears to be arms-length, 
but which will transact the 50 bitcoin back to A at A’s direction. Or, in a different version of this 
hypothetical, consider that irrespective of X, B has agreed to hold the 50 bitcoin for A as its undisclosed 
agent until litigation is concluded in exchange for some other benefit. Or, in a different version of this 
hypothetical, the condition to be reported by oracle 1 never occurs and can never be reported. 
 50 Such a “vitality check” may be accomplished by software that sends an email on a regular 
interval that that requires a response by a date and time to abstain from initiating a transaction. 
 51 What Is Bitcoin and How Does It Fit into Estate Planning, TINDALL, GASK, BENTLEY LAWYERS 
(June 6, 2014), https://tgb.com.au/news-features/what-is-bitcoin-and-how-does-it-fit-into-estate-
planning/ [https://perma.cc/DGA7-PXG9]. 
 52 See Jingnan Huo, Lawyer Says Dead Man’s Switch Not Best Option for Digital Asset 
Inheritance, COIN TELEGRAPH (Oct. 28, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/lawyer-says-dead-mans-
switch-not-best-option-for-digital-asset-inheritance [https://perma.cc/PHA5-2EPD] (recognizing 
Ethereum as the likely candidate to facilitate these transactions, but noting its youth and the recent DAO 
hack that caused a hard fork). 
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C. Implication of Lost/Forgotten Private Keys 
Private keys generally cannot be recovered if lost or forgotten.53 
Unlike most financial instruments which function through or with the 
cooperation of an intermediary, there is usually no central entity in control 
of a cryptoasset system that can replace or restore a lost private key, or 
otherwise provide access to the cryptoassets associated with a lost or 
forgotten private key.54 These systems do not feature a central actor who 
can respond to a turnover order; a court will not receive a response if it 
attempts to subpoena information from, for example, the Bitcoin network.55 
As discussed supra, some cryptoasset users leave their assets on centralized 
third-party exchanges that may respond to court process, but this is the 
exception, not the rule. The loss of a private key may subject assets 
controlled by that key to immediate immobilization and permanent 
illiquidity.56 
Certain systems and service providers allow users to backup private 
keys, or to regenerate private keys if they are lost using a “seed phrase” 
which is typically a combination of sixteen English language words which, 
if input into the appropriate software, will recover that user’s private key.57 
While helpful, seed phrases may be stolen and lost too, so the issues 
discussed herein remain. 
 
 53 S. Eskandari et al., A First Look at the Usability of Bitcoin Key Management, “A first look at the 
usability of bitcoin key management,” Workshop on Usable Security (USEC) at 2 (2015), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.04351.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7XS-QM6F] (“However, if access to such a 
password is lost, online services generally offer account recovery mechanisms (e.g., based on email). 
No such recovery mechanism exists for self-managed cryptographic keys.”) 
 54 Id. See generally James Howells Searches for Hard Drive with £4m-worth of Bitcoins Stored, 
BBC (Nov. 28, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-south-east-wales-25134289 
[https://perma.cc/WQW9-P9V4]. Users relying on hosted third-party wallets, however, may have 
recourse. See discussion, supra, in Section I(A). 
 55 Although many argue this point, cryptocurrency systems generally tout themselves as 
“decentralized” but actually reallocate authority and power typically reposed in a single party to 
different actors or groups of actors within those systems. This decentralization complicates, but does 
not eliminate, the ability to identify parties responsible for the actions of a given software network. See 
generally Adem Efe Gencer et al., Decentralization in Bitcoin and Ethereum Networks, FIN. 
CRYPTOGRAPHY & DATA SEC., arXiv:1801.03998 (2018); Angela Walch, Deconstructing 
‘Decentralization’: Exploring the Core Claim of Crypto Systems, CRYPTOASSETS: LEGAL & 
MONETARY PERSPS. (forthcoming) (offering a comprehensive examination of the potentially misleading 
claims of “decentralization” in the context of public network cryptocurrency systems). 
 56 The assets associated with private keys do not “disappear” when private keys are lost. The party 
who lost the key loses control of the asset. Eric (Rick) S. Rein & John Guzzardo, The Trustee and the 
Bitcoin Identifying and Recovering International Cryptocurrency Assets, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 34 
(August 2018) (“[W]ithout the complete private key, no court or legal authority can manipulate 
ownership of a blockchain asset. . . .”). 
 57 Seed Phrase, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Seed_phrase [https://perma.cc/DBF6-
TDUM]. 
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A private key may be held in numerous places (i.e. by being 
externalized and held concurrently in a user’s pocket and safe deposit box) 
and may be held by more than one person at any given time, each of whom 
by virtue of possession has equal access to all assets held in that wallet. A 
private key may be claimed to be lost or forgotten, only to be “found,” 
remembered, or rediscovered years later. Assuming that the cryptoassets at 
issue retain commercial value, “lost” or “forgotten” private keys that are 
recovered years later may be an effective way to secret value. 
D. Orders Requiring Production of Private Keys or Transfer of 
Cryptoassets 
Courts may order parties to divulge their private key or to transfer 
cryptoassets controlled by a private key in a variety of situations. Orders or 
writs allow parties to discover assets in post-judgment collection matters.58 
Assets are routinely disclosed in discovery conducted in marriage 
dissolution actions,59 probate litigation,60 or in actions where financial status 
is an element of a party’s claim or defense61 such as accounting claims,62 
claims related to profit sharing in a business dispute,63 claims where 
punitive damages are at issue,64 fraudulent transfer actions,65 or in 
bankruptcy-related matters.66 Courts may order67 parties to turn over private 
 
 58 Rule 69(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[i]n aid of the judgment or 
execution, the judgment creditor . . . may obtain discovery from any person—including the judgment 
debtor—as provided in these rules. . . .” FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(2) (emphasis added). Discovery is used 
“to find out about assets on which execution can issue or about assets that have been fraudulently 
transferred or are otherwise beyond the reach of execution.” 12 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3014 (2d ed.1997). 
 59 See Walton v. Walton, 537 So. 2d 658, 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
 60 See In re Estate of Sauey, 869 So. 2d 664, 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 61 See Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, 863 So. 2d 189, 194 (Fla. 2003) (“[W]here 
materials sought by a party ‘would appear to be relevant to the subject matter of the pending action,’ the 
information is fully discoverable.”) (quoting Epstein v. Epstein, 519 So. 2d 1042, 1043 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1988)). 
 62 See, e.g., Fla. Gaming Corp. of Del. v. Am. Jai-Alai, Inc., 673 So. 2d 523, 524 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996). 
 63 See, e.g., Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Ross, 778 So. 2d 481, 482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). 
 64 Gersh v. Anglin, No. CV 17-50-M-DLC-JCL, 2019 WL 265800 (D. Mont., Jan. 18, 2019) 
(sustaining an interrogatory in discovery requesting disclosure of opposing party’s cryptoasset 
holdings). 
 65 A judgment creditor “is entitled to ‘utilize the full panoply of federal discovery measures’ 
provided for under federal and state law to obtain information from parties and non-parties alike, 
including information about assets on which execution can issue or about assets that have 
been fraudulently transferred.” GATX Corp. v. Appalachian Fuels, LLC, No. CIV.A. 09-41-DLB, 2011 
WL 4015573, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 9, 2011) (quoting Magnaleasing, Inc. v. Staten Island Mall, 76 
F.R.D. 559, 561 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)). 
 66 See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2014) (“The debtor . . . shall . . . unless the court orders otherwise . . . file a 
schedule of assets and liabilities. . . .”); Rein & Guzzardo, supra note 56, at 64 (“With a cooperative 
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keys where establishing the identity of a party in control of cryptoassets or 
who initiated or received a transfer of cryptoassets is relevant and 
material.68 Courts in criminal actions may also order private keys to be 
produced or cryptoassets to be transferred to evidence control of a certain 
cryptoasset wallet,69 in forfeiture matters to seize assets,70 or to prove the 
location or disposition of certain identifiable cryptoassets.71 
II. ENFORCING ORDERS: THE LAW OF COERCIVE CONTEMPT 
Under our common law system,72 courts have the inherent power to 
enforce their own orders.73 An individual’s refusal to decrypt a data source 
 
debtor (or adverse party), the private key will simply be turned over to the trustee at the § 341 meeting 
in order to access the virtual wallet and liquidate the cryptocurrency through the exchange platform.”) 
 67 Because a private key in plain text may be copied or memorized and used to access assets by 
anyone who can read it, a private key disclosure order should limit access to the recorded private key to 
parties who are bound by legal duties of confidentiality. Exposed keys have resulted in theft of 
cryptoassets, including theft by law enforcement officers in the course of an active investigation. See 
generally Cyrus Farivar & Joe Mullin, Stealing Bitcoins with Badges: How Silk Road’s Dirty Cops Got 
Caught, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2016/08/stealing-bitcoins-with-badges-how-silk-roads-dirty-cops-got-caught/ 
[https://perma.cc/J2MD-ZP72]. Key disclosure orders should require private keys to be provided to the 
court under seal, or provided to court-appointed fiduciaries, only, along with an affidavit by the 
producing key holder asserting that the affiant is the only person known to hold the private key and the 
only person known to affiant to execute transactions using that private key. This would prevent claims 
that others had control of the cryptoassets at issue. 
 68 For instance, discovery may be taken to identify a transferee in a fraudulent transfer action. See, 
e.g., In re: Cont’l Capital Inv. Services Inc., Bankruptcy Adv. Pro. No. 03-3370, Adv. Pro. No. 06-
3505, MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO COMPEL, D.E. # 94 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio. Mar. 6, 2009). 
 69 In an analogous matter, see United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238, 241 (3d 
Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018) (seeking to establish 
ownership and control of hard drives known to contain child pornography for the purpose of 
establishing criminal liability). 
 70 COMISKY, FELD & HARRIS, Tax Fraud and Evasion, Volume 2 (Thomson Reuters/Tax & 
Accounting, 1994, with updates through September 2018) (online version accessed on Checkpoint 
(www.checkpoint.riag.com). 
 71 See supra note 70, wherein decryption of a data source was sought to confirm the location of 
contraband which formed the basis for the criminal charges. 
 72 Unlike common law legal systems, code law systems from the “Continental Legal tradition” 
view a party’s failure to comply with a court’s order as a private matter to be enforced by the parties, as 
opposed to our system that views such a failure as an affront and challenge to the Court’s power, and 
which has for centuries permitted courts to “vindicate the court’s authority or its dignity” through 
contempt orders. See generally Carlo Vittorio Giabardo, Disobeying Courts’ Orders—A Comparative 
Analysis of the Civil Contempt of Court Doctrine and of the Image of the Common Law Judge, 10 J. 
Civ. L. Stud. 35, 40 (2018). 
 73 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (quoting Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 
510 (1873)); Paul A. Grote, Purging Contempt: Eliminating the Distinction between Civil and Criminal 
Contempt, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1247, 1250 (2011) (“[P]ower of contempt is inherent in the courts and 
would have been vested in the courts in the absence of a specific legislative grant.”); see also 
Michaelson v. U.S. ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924) (“That the power to 
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may have dire consequences in other contexts;74 in the context of a failure 
to comply with a turnover order, the likely consequence is contempt of 
court.75 Although the history of the jurisprudence underlying contempt is 
hardly a picture of clarity,76 contempt used to coerce future compliance 
with a court order is regarded as civil contempt.77 The theory behind 
coercive contempt is that court orders must be followed, or consequences 
should issue.78 Those consequences in the case of coercive contempt 
answer the question of “What happens to me if I don’t?”79 
A clear order that provides appropriate notice to the party obligated to 
comply is a predicate to the entry of a contempt sanction.80 To obtain a 
contempt order, the proponent of contempt brings a motion against the 
party charged with compliance with a Court order seeking the imposition of 
contempt for non-compliance, and the party charged with compliance is 
entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the motion is ruled 
upon.81 The court, after considering evidence, must find that the party 
charged with compliance with the court’s order has the present ability to 
comply and has willfully refused to do so.82 Coercive sanctions are not 
 
punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, has been many times decided and may be regarded as 
settled law. It is essential to the administration of justice.”). 
 74 See Tom Davidson, Wife ‘Burns Husband Alive After He Refused to Give Her His Phone 
Password’, UK DAILY MIRROR (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/wife-
burns-husband-alive-after-13871070 [https://perma.cc/P5GZ-MKJU]. 
 75 ”The court for the district where compliance is required . . . may hold in contempt a person who, 
having been served, fails without adequate excuse to obey the subpoena or an order related to it.” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 45(g); see also 17 AM. JUR. 2d Contempt §§ 41, 166 (1990) (In civil contempt, the court 
attempts to coerce the defiant party into complying with an order by imposing fines and/or jail time that 
can be avoided by complying with the underlying order.). 
 76 See generally Grote, supra note 73, at 1250 (analyzing the history of contempt and proposing to 
eliminate the distinction between civil and criminal contempt). 
 77 Int’l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 829 (1994); see also Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441–
42 (2011) (“Civil contempt differs from criminal contempt in that it seeks only to ‘coerc[e] the 
defendant to do’ what a court had previously ordered him to do.”) (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove 
& Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911)); Grote, supra note 73, at 1257 (“A civil contempt is designed 
to coerce the contemnor into compliance.”). 
 78 Giabardo, supra note 72, at 38 (“[T]he rationale of coercive means is to make non-compliance 
with the judicial order less convenient than compliance.”) 
 79 Doug Rendleman, Disobedience and Coercive Contempt Confinement: The Terminally Stubborn 
Contemnor, WASH. & LEE L. REV. 48, 185, 188 (1991). 
 80 In re Keller, 568 B.R. 118 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2017) (“For contempt, the moving party must show 
by clear and convincing evidence the contemnors violated a specific and definite order of the court.”). 
 81 Turner, 564 U.S. at 442 (“[W]here civil contempt is at issue, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause allows a State to provide fewer procedural protections than in a criminal case.”); 
Akridge v. Crow, 903 So. 2d 346, 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (“[S]uch fundamental fairness includes 
notice and an opportunity to be heard.”). 
 82 See, e.g., Gregory v. Rice, 727 So. 2d 251, 254 (Fla. 1999) (“The court must then evaluate the 
evidence and determine whether the alleged contemnor has the present ability to pay the support and 
has willfully refused to do so.”); Notes: Indefinite Confinement as a Coercive Measure by Courts, 1 
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available “when it is clearly established that the alleged contemnor is 
unable to comply with the terms of the order.”83 Once the proponent of 
contempt establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to 
the alleged contemnor, who must then come forward with evidence to show 
inability to comply with the court’s order.84 
The mere assertion of inability to comply is insufficient.85 “In order to 
succeed on the inability defense . . . [the prospective contemnor] must . . . 
establish that he has made in good faith all reasonable efforts to meet the 
terms of the court order he is seeking to avoid.”86 The court will review 
evidence under the clear and convincing standard.87 The trial court 
determines the credibility of the evidence when determining whether to 
discharge contempt or whether to impose penalties for failure to comply 
with the order.88 The court must find based on evidence that the contemnor 
has the ability to comply but has failed to do so.89 Then the court must 
conclude that the entry of a contempt sanction is appropriate. The order 
imposing contempt must provide the contemnor with the ability to purge 
the contempt.90 
 
REGENT U. L. REV. 77, 90 (1991) (“Where the contemptuous act did not occur in the presence of the 
court, the offender has the right to offer evidence and argument in his defense.”). 
 83 See Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 638 n.9 (1988). 
 84 See, e.g., BANKR. EVID. MANUAL § 301:38 (2018 ed.) (collecting citations); United States v. 
Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983); In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002); In re 
Taggart, 548 B.R. 275 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2016) (“[On motion to hold a party in contempt], [t]he moving 
party has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the contemnors violated a 
specific and definite order of the court. The burden then shifts to the contemnors to demonstrate why 
they were unable to comply.”) (quoting In re Bennett, 298 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 85 Huber v. Marine Midland Bank, 51 F.3d 5, 10 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Donovan v. Sovereign 
Security, Ltd., 726 F.2d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 1984)); United States v. Hayes, 722 F.2d 723, 725 (11th Cir. 
1984). 
 86 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Wellington Precious Metals, 950 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th 
Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). 
 87 F.T.C. v. Kuykendall, 371 F.3d 745, 756 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Reliance Ins. Co v. Mast 
Constr. Co., 159 F.3d 1311, 1315 (10th Cir. 1998)). 
 88 In Wellington Precious Metals, 950 F.2d at 1530, the trial court “ . . . found [contemnor’s] 
explanations unworthy of belief.” See also In re Howald, 877 F.2d 849, 850 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating 
the court must make individualized determination of possible future compliance). 
 89 Huber v. Marine Midland Bank, 51 F.3d 5, 10 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[I]f he offers no evidence as to 
his inability to comply . . . or stands mute, he has not met his burden.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 90 Int’l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994) (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range 
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911)) (“In these circumstances, the contemnor is able to purge the contempt 
and obtain his release by committing an affirmative act, and thus ‘carries the keys of his prison in his 
own pocket.’”). 
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While courts have considerable discretion in their choice of remedies 
for contempt,91 courts should never exercise more than “the least possible 
power adequate to the end proposed.”92 Coercive sanctions “‘cannot be any 
greater than necessary to ensure such compliance’ and may not be so 
excessive as to be punitive in nature.”93 In fashioning an appropriate 
remedy, courts must consider “the nature of the harm and the probable 
effect of alternative sanctions.”94 
Trial courts typically only consider the use of conditional 
incarceration as a contempt sanction once other methods to secure 
compliance have been considered.95 To fashion an appropriate remedy, a 
court should consider: “(1) the harm from noncompliance; (2) the probable 
effectiveness of the sanction; (3) the financial resources of the contemnor 
and the burden the sanctions may impose; and (4) the willfulness of the 
contemnor in disregarding the court’s order.”96 Typically, incarceration 
sanctions are only ordered after less severe alternatives have failed or have 
been deemed doomed to fail.97 It must be possible for the contemnor to 
comply with the coercive contempt order;98 the contemnor is said to possess 
the “keys to his own cell” and generally is incarcerated to imprisonment 
until the contempt is purged.99 
E. Arguments of Inability to Comply and Evidence of Self-Created 
Impossibility 
As noted supra, to avoid contempt,100 the putative contemnor must 
provide evidence that the party charged with compliance made “in good 
 
 91 In re Managed Care, 756 F.3d 1222, 1240 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Howard Johnson Co. v. 
Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir. 1990) (“A district court has ‘broad discretion in fashioning 
civil contempt sanctions.’”). 
 92 United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 332 (1947). 
 93  In re Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d at 1558 (quoting Citronelle–Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. 
Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir.1991)). Incarceration runs a high risk of becoming 
punitive. See In re Duggan, 133 B.R. 671, 671–74 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991). Contempt sanctions also risk 
becoming incarceration for debt, which is prohibited. See Myron Fink, Basic Issues in Civil Contempt, 8 
N.M. L. Rev. 55, 71 (1978). 
 94 In re 1990’s Caterers Ltd., 531 B.R. 309, 319 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing In re Chief. Exec. 
Officers Clubs, 359 B.R. at 536). 
 95 Combs v. Ryan’s Coal Co., 785 F.2d 970, 981 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 96 United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 258. 
 97 In re Tate, 521 B.R. 427, 429 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2014). 
 98 Fink, supra note 93, at 60 (“[P]unishment for civil contempt is not really punishment since the 
party imprisoned can control his incarceration by doing the required act.”). 
 99 See Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 649 (1988); Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 
595 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441–42 (1911). 
 100 Other defenses besides impossibility may be asserted to avoid contempt, including, for example, 
the invalidity of the subject order. See In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1401 n.6 (11th Cir.1991); see 
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faith all reasonable efforts” to meet the terms of the court order that party is 
attempting to avoid.101 A contemnor may successfully assert a complete 
defense of impossibility where compliance with the order is actually 
impossible.102 However, courts are likely to be skeptical of claims of 
fortunes irrevocably lost by the only party who had the ability to control 
it.103 So-called self-created impossibility does not excuse non-
compliance.104 The burden to produce sufficient evidence that compliance is 
impossible remains on the putative contemnor.105 In the case of a turnover 
order, a putative contemnor asserting impossibility as a defense will be 
required to provide evidence of the circumstances that led to the loss of that 
private key.106 
To establish impossibility, the “alleged contemnor[] . . . must 
establish: (1) that they were unable to comply, explaining why 
‘categorically and in detail,’ and (2) that their inability to comply was not 
‘self-imposed,’; and (3) that they made ‘in good faith all reasonable efforts 
to comply.’”107 This evidence shall be considered on a case by case basis.108 
The “all reasonable efforts” requirement is interpreted strictly.109 The 
 
also United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 295 (1947). However, this article 
focuses only on the claim that the party charged with compliance is unable to comply because of the 
loss of the private key. 
 101 See In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d at 1300 (citing United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 698, 701 (11th 
Cir. 1988)). 
 102 See Rylander, 460 U.S. at 757; United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 330–331 (1950). 
 103 See In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d at 1298 (citing F.T.C. v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1241 
(9th Cir. 1999)). The court also pointedly observed that, “[w]hile it is possible that a rational person 
would send millions of dollars overseas and retain absolutely no control over the assets, we share the 
district court’s skepticism.” Id. 
 104 See S.E.C. v. Solow, 682 F. Supp. 2d 1312, 1329 (S.D. Fla.), aff’d, 396 F. App’x 635 (11th Cir. 
2010) (citing In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d at 1300); Pesaplastic, C.A. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 799 F.2d 
1510, 1521 (11th Cir. 1986); see also In re Power Recovery Systems, Inc., 950 F.2d 798, 803 (1st Cir. 
1991) (a party may defend contempt and failure to comply on the grounds that compliance 
was impossible; self-induced inability, however, does not meet the test). 
 105 See Rylander, 460 U.S. at 755. 
 106 See In re Luma Camera Serv., Inc., 157 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir. 1946), rev’d sub nom. Maggio v. 
Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948). Contemnors may puzzle over how they can prove they do not have their 
private key with evidence: “[I]t is difficult to prove a negative by documentation. That is generally 
true.” Huber v. Marine Midland Bank, 51 F.3d 5, 11 (2d Cir. 1995). However, as discussed below, 
circumstantial evidence will be critical in the court’s inquiry. 
 107 In re Lawrence, 251 B.R. 630, 652 (S.D. Fla. 2000), aff’d, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 108 See Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 75 (1948) (“Of course we do not attempt to lay down a 
comprehensive or detailed set of rules on this subject. They will have to be formulated as specific and 
concrete cases present different aspects of the problem.”). 
 109 The Eleventh Circuit strictly construes the “all reasonable efforts” requirement of the 
impossibility defense; substantial, diligent, or good faith efforts are not sufficient to rebut a prima facie 
showing of noncompliance. See In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d at 1297; United States v. Roberts, 858 F.2d 
698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hayes, 722 F.2d 723, 725 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding district 
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putative contemnor must evidence taking efforts reasonably necessary to 
purge the contempt.110 
A given contemnor’s motivation for non-compliance may vary–some 
contemnors may have inadvertently lost their keys and in “good faith” lack 
the ability to comply, while other contemnors may tactically fake inability 
to comply, and still other contemnors may believe that their non-
compliance is necessary on ideological grounds to prevent a greater harm. 
Contemnors may believe that cryptoassets should be censorship- and 
collection-resistant,111 and that court orders are a form of censorship to be 
resisted.112 Contemnors may claim to be supporting an ethical or moral 
conviction by refusing to obey.113 Such contemnors may believe that by 
 
court abused its discretion when it held an alleged contemnor showing “some effort” to comply with 
court order was sufficient to rebut moving party’s prima facie case); see also F.T.C. v. Affordable 
Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 1999) (“In the asset protection trust context, moreover, the burden 
on the party asserting an impossibility defense will be particularly high because of the likelihood that 
any attempted compliance with the court’s orders will be merely a charade rather than a good faith 
effort to comply.”); Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 305 B.R. 510, 520 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“The burden is on a 
contemnor to demonstrate ‘categorically and in detail’ why they were unable to comply with an order of 
the court.”). 
 110 See In re Tate, 521 B.R. 427, 444–45 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2014) (“Finally, Tate did not present any 
evidence that he has made ‘all other efforts reasonably necessary to recover the property of the estate’ 
as required by . . . the Contempt Order. Tate provided no evidence that he has attempted to recover the 
portion of the funds supposedly loaned to friends and relatives.); see also Hayes, 722 F.2d at 725–26 
(contemnor ordered to produce financial records did not make all reasonable efforts “‘merely by 
adducing evidence that he requested the documents (even diligent requests involving trips to 
Switzerland), when it appears that he [had] greater leverage at his disposal”). 
 111 Cf. Winkelvoss Captial Funds v. Shrem, No. 18-cv-8250, Memorandum Order (S.D.N.Y.Nov 
19, 2018) (“Stating the fact that defendant invests some of his assets in cryptocurrency (which does not 
make them judgment – proof) . . . does not constitute a showing that he lacks sufficient assets.”). 
 112 For example, “[b]itcoin is a seizure-resistant digital asset with a transparent and incorruptible 
monetary policy, which provides the base, intrinsic (if you want to call it that) value proposition that 
attracts holders.” Kyle Torpey, 3 More Lies Bitcoin Skeptics Tell Themselves, FORBES (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ktorpey/2018/01/30/3-more-lies-bitcoin-skeptics-tell-themselves/1 
[https://perma.cc/JHE3-AGHR]. “The features of programmable money enabled by novel computer 
science and cryptography are: Seizure-Resistant Store of Value — cryptocurrencies as a 
cryptographically secured, seizure-proof, and government censorship resistant digital asset are a clear 
utility,” Electric Capital, Programmable Money, MEDIUM (June 14, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@ElectricCapital/programmable-money-79e16dc7bfca [https://perma.cc/8ELF-
RN83]. This assumption is belied by the extensive history of sovereign nations seizing cryptoassets. See 
generally Nikhilesh De, The Bulgarian Government is Sitting on $3 Billion in Bitcoin, COINDESK, 
https://www.coindesk.com/bulgarian-government-sitting-3-billion-bitcoin [https://perma.cc/F24F-
MM8K]; Larry Cermak, Analysis: The U.S. Has Seized Nearly 200,000 Bitcoins to Date, Global 
Confiscations are Up to 453,000, BLOCK (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.theblockcrypto.com/
2018/11/07/analysis-the-u-s-has-seized-nearly-200000-bitcoins-to-date-global-confiscations-are-up-to-
453000/ [https://perma.cc/BV77-F7WW]. 
 113 Rendleman, supra note 79, at 203 (discussing ideological, religious, ethical, and fear-based 
motivations for non-compliance with court orders). 
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holding out, they clear a path for others to similarly resist.114 Some 
contemnors may seek to create a precedent of resisting orders followed by 
subsequent release from coercive imprisonment to empower others to resist 
similar orders.115 
Although a desire to create precedent may influence a court’s 
evaluation of evidence, such motivation would be improper; contempt 
orders are not intended to create future precedent or to discourage future 
disobedience by future contemnors.116 However, it is foreseeable that others 
similarly situated may observe a Court’s treatment of a contemnor claiming 
a lost private key and be guided by the outcome.117 Advocates of 
cryptoassets as a coercion-resistant asset class may look to the contemnor 
as a test case or view the contemnor as a martyr for suffering sanctions to 
protect their claimed “right” to hold cryptoassets despite a turnover order.118 
However, unlike many social causes, it is unlikely that refusing to comply 
with a court order to hide financial assets will engender broad sympathy, no 
matter the form of technology used.119 
If the court finds based upon evidence that the impossibility is self-
created, the court may find the contemnor in contempt and impose a 
sanction.120 The court’s fact finding must be a considered and precise 
exercise; failing to enforce a court order based upon lies, or ordering the 
incarceration of a party who actually lacks the ability to comply with the 
court’s order are both improper and potentially dangerous outcomes. 
 
 114 See, for example, Morgan v. Fortich, 546 A.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1988), wherein Morgan 
unsuccessfully refused to obey an order to produce her daughter claiming that her ex-husband sexually 
abused the child in prior visitations and that her disobedience was necessary to avoid the more 
significant harm of child abuse. 
 115 Susan Apel, Custodial Parents, Child Sexual Abuse, and the Legal System: Beyond Contempt, 
38 AM. U. L. REV. 491, 525 (1989) (“[R]ecalcitrance then results in imprisonment, but real recalcitrance 
results in release.”). 
 116 Rendleman, supra note 79, at 201. 
 117 Id. at 203 n.97 (collecting cases where contemnor disobedience is based upon the contemnor’s 
ideological motivations). 
 118 Id. at 203 n.98; In re Dohrn, 560 F. Supp. 179, 180 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Linda S. Beres, Civil 
Contempt and the Rational Contemnor, 69 IND. L.J. 723, 753 (1994). 
 119 Cf. Beres, supra note 122 at 753 n. 87 (noting instances where contemnors were released from 
incarceration where their non-compliance was a result of upholding organized crime’s code of silence, 
obtaining the fruits of illegal activities, and furthering friendships with political activists). 
 120 See In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d at 1300 (quoting Pesaplastic, C.A. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 
799 F.2d 1510, 1521 (11th Cir. 1986)) (“Even if we were to find that Lawrence had set forth sufficient 
evidence of impossibility, we must agree with the trial court that Lawrence’s claimed defense is invalid 
because the asserted impossibility was self-created. We previously have held that, ‘where the person 
charged with contempt is responsible for the inability to comply, impossibility is not a defense to 
the contempt proceedings.’”). 
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Some courts may conclude that all claims of impossibility due to the 
contemnor’s loss of her own private keys are self-created impossibility, 
meriting the imposition of sanctions. Although this may compound the 
financial injury already suffered by some contemnors,121 the policy behind 
this conclusion is sound. To suggest otherwise would encourage tactical 
claims of lost keys. For those courts, the inquiry will end there, and their 
subsequent labors will focus on identifying an appropriate sanction as 
discussed in sections III and IV. 
Some courts may wish to distinguish between inadvertent “good faith” 
loss and tactical “bad faith” loss and impose different sanctions for each.122 
In drawing a distinction, these courts will be required to draw conclusions 
from evidence, including testimony and circumstantial evidence obtained 
from computers, witnesses, experts, and third parties. A simple claim that 
the contemnor cannot and will not comply is insufficient and unavailing.123 
In the case of a lost private key, the contemnor would be required to 
provide evidence beyond self-serving testimony that the private key is lost, 
and that the loss was not tactical or strategic to avoid compliance with the 
court’s order. Such evidence would typically include evidence of the 
circumstances behind the claimed loss, evidence that the loss was not 
intentional, and that the party charged with compliance has made in good 
 
 121 Many will bristle at the thought of losing a fortune in cryptoassets because of a faulty memory 
or poor data hygiene, and later being punished in the form of sanctions for the same ineptitude. 
 122 Inability to Comply with Judgment or Order as Defense to Charge of Contempt, 120 A.L.R. 703 
(citing Spear v. McDermott, 926 P.2d 228, 236–37 (N.M. App. 1996) (“When there is genuine inability 
to comply with court order, even if the inability is self-created, it is complete defense to 
coercive contempt sanction such as incarcerating person indefinitely or imposing daily fine; however, 
such inability is not a defense to compensatory sanction such as one-time compensatory fine or sentence 
of imprisonment to punish contemnor or compensate for harm done”)). Discussion of compensatory 
contempt is beyond the scope of this article. 
 123 See Beres, supra note 122, at 734 (“Thus, while a contemnor’s assertion that he will never 
comply may be a necessary condition for release, it rarely will be sufficient.”). Evidence that the private 
key is lost, with nothing more, evidences only recalcitrance. Judges may persist in disbelief if they find 
the contemnor’s claims incredible. See generally Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 75–76 (1948) (“Of 
course, if he offers no evidence as to his inability to comply with the turnover order, or stands mute, he 
does not meet the issue”); SEC v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 803 (5th Cir.1993) (the court is not bound to 
accept unsubstantiated, self-serving testimony as true); U.S. ex rel. Thom v. Jenkins, 760 F.2d 736, 740 
(7th Cir. 1985) (testimony insufficient to meet burden when self-serving, self-contradictory, confusing, 
and uncorroborated); Lopiparo v. United States, 216 F.2d 87, 91 (8th Cir. 1954) (Corporate president 
who failed to produce corporate books and records claiming inability to access records held in 
contempt; court rejected excuse that president was unable to find books and records); In re Cal. Motors, 
Inc., 122 F. Supp. 885, 887 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) (Court rejected respondent’s claim of inability to turn over 
money at issue where respondent could not “satisfactorily explain his inability to turn over the fund . . . 
“); In re Sussman, 85 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1949)(Court rejected debtor’s evidence indicating 
that debtor had no assets and lived on borrowed money, but otherwise did not address funds already 
determined to be in debtor’s possession at the time of bankruptcy filing, finding that debtor’s “ . . . 
explanation of his inability to turn over the money is not sufficient”). 
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faith all reasonable efforts to comply. Evidence of “all reasonable efforts” 
made in “good faith” to comply will likely include evidence of contemnor’s 
efforts to recover the private key, testimony as to the circumstances of the 
loss, attempts to locate saved electronic versions or backups of the private 
key, attempts to use backups, attempts to restore the wallet using a seed 
phrase, forensic examination of remnants on the hard drive of the computer 
or device that hosted the wallet software previously used by the 
contemnor,124 and evidence provided by forensic experts of efforts to 
recover the private key.125 The contemnor could also offer evidence that 
either (a) no transactions occurred since the private key was lost, or (b) that 
subsequent transactions occurred that evidence that another party is 
controlling the private key.126 Although a contemnor may argue that she did 
not have use or control of a given public address, forensic experts may 
trace cryptoasset transfers or identify the parties interacting with certain 
identifiable cryptoassets.127 Likewise, if contemnor claims to be the victim 
of a hack, the contemnor must show some evidence of the hack, including 
the circumstances and timing of the loss associated with that hack, and 
contemnor’s response to the hack. 128 
 
 124 For instance, if the user operated a full bitcoin node, the wallet.dat file should be present on the 
hard drive of that computer and may be a source of forensic information sufficient to recover a private 
key. Similarly, files in the install and related profile directories may contain information sufficient to 
recover a key. Useful forensic data may not be available for all cryptoassets; transactions made using 
privacy-enabled assets like Monero or Zcash may be significantly more difficult to trace. 
 125 For example, www.walletrecoveryservices.com offers a service to assist with private key 
recovery. WALLET RECOVERY SERVICES, https://walletrecoveryservices.com [https://perma.cc/L3N2-
L7LP]. This service requires the wallet user to provide basic information regarding the private key. See 
generally Mark Frauenfelder, ‘I Forgot My Pin’: An Epic Tale of Losing $30,000 in Bitcoin, WIRED 
(Oct. 29, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/i-forgot-my-pin-an-epic-tale-of-losing-dollar30000-in-
bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/PQN5-A9MP]; Conor Blenkinsop, How to Recover Your Wallet if Your 
Private Keys are Lost, COINTELEGRAPH (Nov. 16, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/how-to-
recover-your-wallet-if-your-private-keys-are-lost [https://perma.cc/3FTR-PSZC]. 
 126 Courts should carefully examine such evidence; a claim that a hacker used a stolen private key 
after the date of the claimed loss of the private key to transact offered as evidence of the hack could be a 
disguised nLockTime transaction set by the contemnor prior to the date of the claimed “loss.” See 
discussion supra. 
 127 See Andy Greenberg, Your Sloppy Bitcoin Drug Deals Will Haunt You For Years, WIRED (Jan. 
26, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/bitcoin-drug-deals-silk-road- 
blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/N9LY-LLL2]; Jeff John Roberts, To Catch a Bitcoin Thief, Call These 
Detectives, FORTUNE (June 27, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/06/27/bitcoin-detective-zcash-
cryptocurrency [https://perma.cc/X47T-ZUDA] (“Chainalysis can identify clusters of wallets tied to 
criminal activity, enabling law enforcement to look for other online clues to connect them to a real-life 
identity.”); see also infra note 132. 
 128 This evidence may be in the form of an expert forensic report, expert testimony, or evidence 
demonstrating diligent response to the hack when detected, such as a police report, a timely submitted 
insurance claim, and other similar documents. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
248 
Cooperation to identify transactions that could subsequently be 
recovered would also show the contemnor’s good faith. In the circumstance 
of a pre-set nLockTime transaction or pre-funded smart contract, the 
contemnor may contact the prospective transferee and either seek to 
compel them to turn over the cryptoassets when received or identify the 
transferee to the court.129 A contemnor’s failure or refusal to do so 
evidences bad faith, as it strains credibility to suggest that the contemnor 
pre-funded a transaction to transfer value to a third party, yet does not 
know that third party.130 
In determining the credibility of the contemnor’s evidence, the court 
should look to badges of fraud used in various states’ Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act statutes to identify “red flags that would tend to evidence 
strategic or tactical key loss.”131 Those badges may be used as objective 
factors to infer the circumstances underlying the claimed loss of private key 
from the evidence before the court. Among various factors specified in the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, the court should consider as “red flags” 
evidence that the assets controlled by the private key at issue were actually 
transferred to an insider, were transferred but still retained within the 
control of the contemnor, or were concealed. In addition, the court should 
consider evidence that (1) the contemnor was threatened with suit prior to 
the loss of the private key, (2) the loss of the private key resulted in the loss 
of all or substantially all of the contemnor’s assets, (3) the loss of the 
private key occurred in order to obscure or avoid detection, (4) the loss of 
the private key rendered the contemnor insolvent, and (5) the loss of the 
private key occurred shortly before or after a substantial debt was incurred. 
If there is evidence to support these “badges of fraud,” the court may find 
that the evidence provided by the contemnor lacks credibility, or evidences 
tactical or intentional loss of private keys. 
The proponent of contempt who seeks to establish that the private key 
loss is tactical or intentional would not be required to submit evidence to 
establish prior use of the private key; that evidence is determined by the 
turnover order and is res judicata.132 However, the proponent of contempt 
 
 129 The court could then enter appropriate orders to compel the transferee to turn over the assets at 
issue. 
 130 See In re Lawrence, 251 B.R. at 652 n.18 (“The Debtor has testified that he voluntarily 
established the Alleged Trust in 1991. Since the provisions which he now relies upon in order to 
substantiate his inability to comply with the Turn Over Order were of his own creation, he may not 
claim the benefit of the impossibility defense.”). 
 131 See generally Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, FLA. STAT. § 726.105(2) (2018) (as adopted by 
Florida). 
 132 In re Sussman, 85 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1949)(Findings based on evidence which gave 
rise to the initial turn over order were res judiciata and “ . . . the bankrupt may not go behind that order 
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may provide evidence to show that the loss was premeditated. Such 
evidence would include transactions with others that can be identified on 
the cryptoasset system’s blockchain, banking records evidencing the 
purchase of cryptoassets via exchange or money services business,133 or 
evidencing the receipt of funds from vendors that convert cryptoassets to 
fiat currency. Forensic evidence suggesting that assets were loaded into 
smart contracts or nLockTime transactions shortly before the claimed loss 
would suggest premeditation or an intentional claim of loss. Likewise, 
forensic examination of transactions prior to the purported loss may reveal 
transfers to insiders, or to other wallets controlled by the contemnor. Other 
evidence that may suggest tactical or purposeful loss includes if a 
contemnor failed to attempt to obtain technical assistance in an attempt to 
restore the private key around the time the loss was discovered, if there was 
loss or destruction of computers or devices previously used to access the 
contemnor’s wallet, or if there was an intentional “wiping” of data or 
stripping of data sources from those devices.134 Similarly, conversion of 
cryptoassets into a privacy enabled cryptoasset may also evidence attempt 
to circumvent tracing.135 
At least one court has considered evidence on a motion to hold a party 
charged with compliance with a turnover order in contempt, albeit in a 
different context. In U.S. v. Apple MacPro Computer,136 a criminal court 
sought to compel a defendant to unencrypt a hard disc drive that was 
suspected to hold child pornography. Defendant, when ordered to enter 
passwords to decrypt his external hard drives, entered several incorrect 
passwords during the forensic examination “and stated that he could not 
remember the passwords.”137 The trial court held the defendant in contempt 
of court for willfully disobeying its order to decrypt the external hard 
drives. The trial court found the defendant’s testimony not to be credible 
 
and show that the Referee was in error”), Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 66 (1948) (turnover order is res 
judicata and is not subject to collateral attack in the contempt proceedings). 
 133 These purchase records are critical, as most purchases of cryptoassets occur with a regulated 
entity providing cryptoassets in exchange for fiat currency payment. These records, and discovery to be 
taken from that regulated entity, will typically be used by a forensic consultant as the starting point for 
their forensic tracing. Rein & Guzzardo, supra note 56, at 64 (“In cases where the debtor attempts to 
conceal the existence of a virtual wallet, a trustee might be able to discover evidence from the debtor’s 
‘traditional’ financial records (account or credit card statements) of the debtor ‘cashing in’ or ‘cashing 
out’ on that platform.”). 
 134 See In re Lawrence, 251 B.R. at 652 (voluntary acts of the contemnor that facially appear 
calculated to avoid turnover evidence bad faith). 
 135 See note 182, infra, discussing privacy enabled cryptoassets. 
 136 United States v. Apple MacPro Computer, 851 F.3d 238, 241 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub 
nom. Doe v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018). 
 137 Id. at 243. 
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and “found that [Defendant] remembered the passwords needed to decrypt 
the hard drives but chose not to reveal them because of the devices’ 
contents.”138 At the hearing conducted on the Government’s motion seeking 
the entry of contempt, defendant put on no evidence. The Court ruled in 
favor of the Government and entered contempt sanctions. On appeal, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the government provided 
sufficient evidence to support contempt, including: testimony by 
defendant’s sister evidencing that defendant formerly memorized 
passwords to his data sources, from a detective who testified that defendant 
did not provide his password at the time because he wanted to prevent the 
police from accessing his computer, and that defendant did not previously 
assert an inability to remember the passwords. The Third Circuit affirmed 
the entry of contempt.139 
F. How Long May a Contemnor Be Incarcerated Pursuant to a Coercive 
Contempt Sanction? 
Courts have held that there is “no temporal limitation on the amount 
of time that a contemnor can be confined for civil contempt when it is 
undisputed that the contemnor has the ability to comply with the underlying 
order.”140 Thus, incarceration for coercive contempt may continue 
indefinitely, as long as the court determines that the sanction maintains its 
coercive effect.141 A court may incarcerate the contemnor as a coercive 
sanction for civil contempt, so long as “the contemnor is able to purge the 
contempt and obtain his release by committing an affirmative act.”142 
Confinement may last as long as the contemnor’s lifetime.143 
 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 249. 
 140 United States v. Harris, 582 F.3d 512, 517 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Int’l Union v. Bagwell, 512 
U.S. 821, 828 (1994)). However, the duration of incarceration may be limited for certain types of 
contempt; the Federal Recalcitrant Witness Statute caps incarceration for refusal to testify at trial or 
grand jury at eighteen months. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (2012). 
 141 Chadwick v. Janecka, 312 F.3d 597, 608 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The meaning of the statement 
in Bagwell that a contemnor may be held ‘indefinitely until he complies’ is perfectly clear. The phrase 
‘until he complies’ sets the point in time when confinement must cease. The term ‘indefinitely’ 
describes the length of confinement up to that point, namely, a period ‘having no exact limits,’ because 
the end point (the time of compliance) cannot be foretold.”); Rendleman, supra note 79, at 196 n.56 
(1991) (citing In re Griffin, 677 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D. Me. 1988)) (“[H]olding that confinement must 
continue as long as a judge is satisfied that coercive sanction might produce intended result.”); The 
Coercive Function of Civil Contempt, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 120, 122 (1965) (“[C]onfinement may 
continue until compliance.”). 
 142 In re 1990’s Caterers Ltd., 531 B.R. 309, 319 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 2015) (quoting Bagwell, 512 
U.S. at 828–29 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
 143 See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 82 (1959); Penfield Co. v. S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585, 594 
(1947); In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 449 (8th Cir. 1902); Culver City v. Superior Court, 241 P.2d 258, 261–
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However, the power to incarcerate must be limited, given its 
“awesome potential for abuse.”144 Civil contempt is determined by a single 
judge, using considerably less due process than provided in a criminal 
matter.145 As the decision to release a contemnor from incarceration is fact 
and judge specific, the common law test for when a contempt sanction has 
lost its coercive effect may result in seemingly illogical or absurd 
outcomes.146 
A contemnor’s term of incarceration may be for an indefinite period 
but must remain coercive.147 Courts typically periodically reassess whether 
there remains a realistic possibility the contemnor will yield to 
the coercive effect of the sanction.148 In such cases, trial courts will 
consider, among other things, the passage of time, the fungible quality of 
the assets subject to turnover and the likelihood of the contemnor further 
misbehaving upon release.149 The key to the inquiry is the contemnor’s 
ability to comply. 150 
A judge’s determination of whether a contempt sanction has lost its 
coercive effect is basically unreviewable.151 However, multiple courts have 
released contemnors after lengthy incarcerations based upon the perceived 
 
62 (Cal. 1952); City of Vernon v. Superior Court, 241 P.2d 243, 245 (Cal. 1952); see also Moskovitz, 
Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 780, 801, 802–02; Comment, Equity-
Contempt-Duration of Imprisonment, 36 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1018 (1938). 
 144 Rendleman, supra note 79, at 190; The Coercive Function of Civil Contempt, supra note 145, at 
133 (“[C]oercive imprisonment is a powerful judicial tool for the enforcement of court orders. On 
occasion it can, however, be too powerful.”). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. at 210 (“Dr. Elizabeth Morgan declined to release her daughter to the child’s father because 
she feared sexual abuse; she spent twenty-five months in a District of Columbia jail, seven months 
longer than a thug who refused, under grant of immunity, to identify criminals.”). 
 147 Wellington Precious Metals, 950 F.2d at 1530 (“[W]hen civil contempt sanctions lose 
their coercive effect, they become punitive and violate the contemnor’s due process 
rights.”); see Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442. 
 148 See In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d at 1301 (“If the bankruptcy judge determines that, although 
Lawrence has the ability to turnover the Trust res, he will steadfastly refuse to do so, the judge will be 
obligated to release Lawrence because the subject incarceration would no longer serve the civil purpose 
of coercion.”); United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752 (1983) (finding when a contemnor provides 
evidence they are no longer able to comply, the incarceration would be punitive and presumably 
convert to a criminal contempt or give grounds for application to discharge the contempt sanction). 
 149 Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 66 (1948). 
 150 Id. at 72 (noting that jailing someone for omitting an act the individual is powerless to do would 
make contempt proceedings purely punitive). 
 151 Wellington Precious Metals, 950 F.2d at 1531 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Simkin v. United States, 
715 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that in determining whether a civil contempt sanction has lost 
its coercive effect, the trial judge has virtually unreviewable discretion)); see also Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Armstrong, 284 F.3d 404, 406–07 (2d Cir. 2002). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
252 
lack of effect of continued incarceration.152 Although the initial factual 
assessment giving rise to incarceration has a res judicata effect,153 the court 
may revisit the evidence, examine the contemnor’s ability to comply at 
present, “articulate its present belief, and terminate coercive 
confinement.”154 
In the context of a lost private key, if the key is lost and a party has 
sought to recover it through diligent investigation, including the 
examination of the wallet and with the assistance of experts, incarceration 
may never have a coercive effect. This draws into question the use of the 
sanction of incarceration for self-created impossibility and suggests that 
where the evidence shows that a private key is lost in “good faith,” other 
sanctions may be more appropriate, as argued in sections III and IV. 
However, where the evidence shows that the loss of the private key is 
tactical or in bad faith to avoid compliance with the order, incarceration 
sanctions may still be appropriate.155 
G. What If the Contemnor Invokes Their Fifth Amendment Right Against 
Self-Incrimination as a Basis to Refuse to Comply? 
Federal courts have found no inherent Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination violations with ordering an individual to unencrypt a hard-
drive.156 Notwithstanding, a contemnor may invoke her Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination, and, on that basis, refuse to comply with a 
court’s order. This claim of right under the Fifth Amendment is not 
evidence and will not meet the burden of compliance or provide evidence 
 
 152 See In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d 1294 at 1301 (explaining that the trial court will be obligated to 
release the incarcerated contemnor if it concludes that he will steadfastly refuse to comply with the 
court’s order even though he retains the ability to comply); United States v. Harris, 582 F.3d 512, 522 
(3d Cir. 2009) (DuBois, J., concurring opinion) (discussing Delaware state court judge’s order directing 
the release of H. Beatty Chadwick from incarceration after more than 14 years—what the authors 
believe is the longest term of incarceration civil contempt to date—despite finding that the contemnor 
had the present ability to comply with an order directing him to deposit $2.5 million with the court, 
which concluded that the contempt order had lost its coercive effect given the contemnor’s continued 
refusal to comply). 
 153 Rendleman, supra note 79, at 195. See also supra, note 136. 
 154 Id. 
 155 See supra note 138. 
 156 Raskin, supra note 41, at 999 n.222 (citing United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1236 
(D. Colo. 2012) (recapitulating the “[t]he small universe of decisions dealing with the Fifth Amendment 
issues implicated by compelling a witness or defendant to provide a password to an encrypted computer 
or otherwise permit access to its unencrypted contents”); United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 
665, 669 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (finding a Fifth Amendment violation because defendant’s divulging his 
password was a testimonial communication); In re Boucher, No. 2:06-MJ-91, 2009 WL 424718, at *4 
(D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009) (finding no Fifth Amendment violation because defendant’s decryption of a 
hard-drive was not incriminating testimonial evidence).). See generally Orin Kerr, Compelled 
Decryption and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 96 TEXAS L. REV. 767. 
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of impossibility of performance.157 However, the impact of this claim of 
right depends on the nature of the order at issue. If the order only requires 
the contemnor to use the private key, then the testimonial aspect of 
compliance is limited to the implied statement that the suspect knows the 
password.158 In that circumstance, according to Professor Kerr, where the 
movant can show that the party subject to the order knows the password, 
“the assertion is a foregone conclusion and the Fifth Amendment poses no 
bar to the enforcement of the order.”159 If the order requires the private key 
to be communicated, which would be direct testimony,160 the foregone 
conclusion doctrine does not apply and the Fifth Amendment may protect 
the contemnor from her obligation under the order to provide that 
testimony.161 This may have broader implications befitting further analysis 
given that decrypting a cryptoasset wallet implicates access to monetary 
value (as opposed to other forms of data), and suggests ongoing association 
with acts described on the ledger of transactions conducted using public 
key addresses associated with that private key.162 Orders requiring a 
contemnor to use a private key, rather than to reveal a private key in 
writing, will not be defeated or mooted by a claim under the Fifth 
Amendment by the contemnor, assuming the proponent of the order has 
established by competent evidence that the contemnor has the private 
key.163 
 
 157 See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983) (“But while the assertion of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination may be a valid ground upon which a 
witness . . . declines to answer questions, it has never been thought to be in itself a substitute for 
evidence that would assist in meeting a burden of production.”). 
 158 Kerr, supra note 155, at 778 (“Entering a password that unlocks a device has a testimonial 
component: It testifies that the person knows the password that unlocks the device.”). An order that 
requires a party to transfer cryptoassets is different from an order that requires a party to produce a 
private key. A user may transfer cryptoassets by using their private key without disclosing that private 
key to a third party. An order that requires turnover of a private key functionally provides evidence that 
the party disclosing has the private key, and shares control of the assets controlled by that private key 
with anyone else who has knowledge of that private key. 
 159 Id, at 767. 
 160 Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Orin Kerr in Support of Neither Party at 5, Commonwealth v. 
Jones, 117 N.E.3d 702 (Mass. 2019) (No. SJC-12564), 2018 WL 5269423. 
 161 See supra note 157. 
 162 The implications of the Fifth Amendment invocation protecting information which is the 
equivalent of bearer forms of value, and the potential for abuse of compelled production are important, 
but beyond the scope of this note. 
 163 As discussed supra, such evidence will typically be established by evidence of payment of fiat 
to obtain cryptoassets from conventional bank records and from experts who will use forensic tools to 
establish that Listed Cryptoassets, as defined and discussed in Section IV herein, are controlled by the 
public and private key at issue. 
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III. PROBLEMS IN THE USE OF TRADITIONAL COERCIVE CONTEMPT 
SANCTIONS 
Because cryptoasset systems are optimized for rapid, irreversible asset 
transaction, generally are not conducted through centralized intermediaries 
who will respond to court process,164 and leave a relatively sparse and novel 
forensic record, a claim of lost private keys may be an instance in which 
immediate use of a strong sanction is prudent.165 
Although some have suggested that traditional contempt sanctions 
should be used to compel compliance with orders compelling production of 
a private key,166 it is unclear whether coercive incarceration is an effective 
sanction in this context.167 In the case of a lying contemnor who has hidden 
a private key, that contemnor may be content to wait out a contempt 
sanction, and upon the court determining that contempt is no longer having 
a coercive effect,168 immediately access their stored wealth using their 
secreted private key, provided they are willing to tolerate temporary 
deprivation of liberty and to bear market and technology risk.169 The threat 
of (and reality of) long term incarceration may compel compliance by some 
contemnors, but incarceration may not be sufficient motivation for 
contemnors who have large amounts of cryptoasset value or who are 
ideologically motivated to resist.170 
Those contemnors may know that their assets are protected and may 
be either passed to another while incarcerated or held indefinitely until they 
 
 164 Any cryptoassets maintained by an incorporated third party could be discovered using typical 
court process, including subpoenas and writs. 
 165 Contempt incarceration is appropriate when less severe sanctions would lack the force 
necessary to compel compliance. See Commercial Banking Co. v. Jones, 148 B.R. 353, 359 (M.D. Ga. 
1992) (holding coercive incarceration should be ordered when the contemnor has an established history 
of noncompliance and the circumstances indicate less severe sanctions would lack the force necessary 
to coerce compliance). 
 166 Rein & Guzzardo, supra note 56, at 34, 64. 
 167 Beres, supra note 122, at 724 (“In most cases, however, a rational individual faced with a court 
order never will comply after serving a period of incarceration. He either will comply immediately or 
not at all . . . . . . In general, belated compliance will occur only where an individual lacks perfect 
information at the time of his original decision to disobey the court order.”). 
 168 See In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d at 1301 (“If the bankruptcy judge determines that, although 
Lawrence has the ability to turn over the Trust res, he will steadfastly refuse to do so, the judge will be 
obligated to release Lawrence because the subject incarceration would no longer serve the civil purpose 
of coercion.”). 
 169 The contemnor who decides to “hold out” bears the risk that their cryptoassets will diminish in 
value, that the software system that enables those assets to be transacted may cease to be operational, 
that she may be hacked, or that the cryptoasssets may be forked to another asset, all of which would 
impact the commercial value of those secreted assets. 
 170 Beres, supra note 123, at 754 (“[T]he more stubborn a contemnor appears, the more likely he is 
to be released and thus the lower his expected jail term.”). 
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are released. A wily contemnor would not transfer assets “on chain” while 
in custody, as that transfer can easily be detected and may give rise to 
additional adverse consequences.171 However, it would be trivial for a 
contemnor to write her private key on a piece of paper and hand that paper 
to another person, or to “encode” it in an email message, or to whisper it to 
a visitor, and by doing so transfer control of her assets to another person 
without creating an obvious or detectable record of the transfer. Likewise, 
hardware wallets or physical wallets may be “lost,” only to be found years 
later. That a large amount of value may be at issue suggests that harsher 
penalties may be required as the contemnor may have sufficient incentive 
to wait through whatever incarceration is imposed to recover both his 
liberty and substantial amounts of concealed property.172 Under those 
circumstances, a contemnor may have no incentive to comply, and may 
decide that ten to fifteen years in prison is a price worth paying to preserve 
a safely hidden fortune waiting for the contemnor upon release.173 
Thus, mere incarceration may be insufficient. Given how easily a 
private key may be communicated, the court may wish to restrict that 
contemnor’s ability to share the private key during incarceration by 
restricting a contemnor’s ability to communicate. A court may order full 
surveillance of all of a contemnor’s communications while incarcerated, 
including telephone calls, writings, text messages, email communications, 
and in-person communications to ensure that a contemnor does not pass a 
 
 171 Failing to disclose assets in bankruptcy, for example, may jeopardize the debtor’s opportunity to 
have her debts discharged, result in the loss of a claim, or give rise to criminal perjury charges. See In re 
Colvin, 288 B.R. 477, 483 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003) (debtor’s failure to disclose tax refund resulted in 
loss of exemption over that refund); In re Kasal, 217 B.R. 727, 739 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.1998), aff’d sub 
nom. Casey v. Kasal, 223 B.R. 879 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (debtor denied discharge of debts for “knowing and 
fraudulent” failure to disclose assets and misleading asset disclosures). See also fn 18, supra. 
 172  Armstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89, 111 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The Court’s statement 
in Maggio can be viewed as an ‘inference that may be drawn under most circumstances when a 
contemnor, despite long confinement, fails to comply with an order . . . Thus, in most cases, after a 
certain period, the inference that the contemnor is unable to comply becomes overwhelming.’”) 
(internal citations omitted). Armstrong’s case, however, is not the ordinary case. Fifteen million dollars 
is a life-altering amount of money. We think that the value of the concealed property is a significant 
factor to the extent that it would lead the contemnor to conclude that the risk of continued incarceration 
is worth the potential benefit of securing both his freedom and the concealed property. See Armstrong, 
284 F.3d at 406 (“True, Armstrong has been confined for more than two years, but the length of 
confinement must be viewed in the light of the value of the concealed property, which is unusually 
great.”). (the parenthesis in this footnote appear off) 
 173 Jonathan Lane, Bitcoin, Silk Road, and the Need for a New Approach to Virtual Currency 
Regulation, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 511, 555–56 (2014) (“[N]o level of regulation will definitively 
enable the government to compel a defendant to provide memorized private key information that is not 
stored in any tangible medium.”). 
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private key to another.174 Of course, persistent surveillance implicates 
considerable intrusion of the contemnor’s privacy and would require 
extraordinary effort by the state. However, courts order surveillance over 
parties in circumstances including where conduct at issue would give rise 
to offenses punishable by more than one year of imprisonment,175 and 
incarcerated parties have limited privacy rights.176 Given that any form of 
communication can be used to communicate a private key or seed phrase to 
a third party, full surveillance of an incarcerated contemnor may be 
necessary to prevent or, at minimum, detect such efforts by the contemnor. 
While even full surveillance of the contemnor may not prevent that 
contemnor from transferring a private key to another person, such 
surveillance may narrow the population of prospective transferees for 
future proceedings to recover transfers or for aiding and abetting violation 
of the court’s order. 
However, rather than wait for a contemnor to fail to comply with an 
order or impose expensive and dystopian means to attempt to coerce 
compliance or prevent further violations of turnover orders, courts and 
counsel should proactively adapt their strategies around these new assets. 
IV. NEW PARADIGMS CALL FOR NEW SOLUTIONS: ADAPTING CONTEMPT 
SANCTIONS TO CRYPTOASSETS 
Courts and parties should treat these new assets in new ways; instead 
of arguing over evidence of loss of private keys, courts and parties should 
take steps to avoid private key loss, or to address the claimed loss of a 
private key at the earliest possible instance. 
H. Proactive Measures to Prevent Private Key Loss 
First, courts or parties may impose an express duty to preserve private 
keys. Parties in litigation, upon the occurrence of an event, filing, or ruling 
that gives rise to a right for a party to take discovery of a party’s financial 
condition or assets, to seek disclosure of a private key, or to attach or 
 
 174 Ignoring the question of whether this full surveillance is possible, from a practical perspective, 
courts, legislators, and prison officials may be loath to fund and build a panopticon to punish a small 
class of imprisoned contemnors. 
 175 STANDARDS FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS § 2-4.4, AM. 
BAR ASS’N (2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/publications/
criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_private1/#part44 [https://perma.cc/XC59-KDXA] 
(“An application for an order authorizing electronic surveillance should be permitted only for the 
investigation of offenses which are punishable by more than one year imprisonment and have been 
designated by the legislature as serious enough to justify the intrusiveness of the surveillance.”). 
 176 Inmates generally do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 
U.S. 517, 530 (1984). 
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execute against a party’s assets, should immediately seek the entry of an 
affirmative injunction177 against the party in possession of the private key to 
obligate that party to (a) direct those assets to a third party actor or system 
that can “recover” those assets for their owner if the key is subsequently 
lost, or (b) provide a record of or backup of the private keys to their 
counsel, and to notify those parties of severe sanctions if that private key is 
lost (or as may be appropriate, if value is transacted out of that wallet178) 
thereafter. Proactive measures may avoid the need to argue over 
circumstantial evidence of potential bad faith spoliation or loss of assets 
while also giving courts the predicate to impose punitive sanctions for 
violations of the court’s injunction, including evidentiary presumptionsand 
potentially striking claims and defenses. 
Courts could standardize this practice by issuing standing orders or 
local rules to require parties to backup and retain private keys at the 
initiation of litigation or with the filing of claims or defenses implicating 
parties’ financial condition. These rules or orders would expressly create a 
duty to retain or duty to back up private keys, similar to duties to preserve 
evidence that generally arise in litigation when the parties reasonably 
anticipate litigation.179 Although a party could trigger the same obligation 
by serving a discovery request upon the party to be charged with 
production of the private key, this strategy would likely require additional 
litigation over discovery objections. Injunctions, local rules or standing 
orders would also lay a clearer path for the imposition of adverse 
inferences, striking claims, defenses, and similar spoliation-type sanctions, 
and eliminate surprise claims that private keys providing access to 
cryptoassets at issue have been “lost.” 
I. New Contempt Sanctions 
Although proactive measures may eliminate surprise and reduce the 
opportunity for a party to tactically claim private key loss, these proactive 
measures cannot prevent all fraudulent claims of lost private keys nor 
recover truly lost keys. No matter the strategy or sanction, court power over 
the contemnor can only seek to motivate the contemnor to comply. 
 
 177 Rendleman, supra note 79, at 189 (“Injunctions are preventive and individualized remedies to 
protect citizens’ rights that judges cannot compensate with money.”). 
 178 A user may send cryptoassets from wallet to wallet, or public key address to public key address 
without losing possession or control of that asset, but so doing complicates subsequent efforts to 
recover those assets. 
 179 See Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Micron Tech., 
Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 
F.R.D. 497, 521 (D. Md. 2010). It may be argued that the existing duty to preserve evidence would 
apply in this case. 
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Courts should consider using new sanctions that focus on the unique 
attributes of the assets at issue. Instead of relying upon sanctions that seek 
to compel contemnors to comply, courts could instead act directly on the 
assets at issue by exercising power over intermediaries who facilitate 
transactions of the assets subject to court orders without the contemnor’s 
cooperation.180 
J. State or Federal Cryptoasset Registries 
Unlike cash, many cryptoassets181 are non-fungible and thus 
identifiable, either by sender public key address,182 or by transaction 
output183 in the case of Bitcoin-based systems. Courts could use these 
attributes to impose a novel form of lien against the cryptoassets at issue. 
State legislatures could create public key registries, akin to state secured 
transaction registries,184 wherein courts could “add” public key addresses, 
discrete transaction outputs, or both (Listed Cryptoassets) for identifiable 
assets associated with the wallets known to be used by parties that are 
charged with compliance with turnover orders. A so-called Listed 
Cryptoasset Registry (LCR) would provide actual notice to the public that 
Listed Cryptoassets found thereon are subject to turnover orders. State law 
could then require regulated money services businesses to cross reference 
the LCR before permitting any transaction, to seize any transactions 
including Listed Cryptoassets, and to report that seizure to the listing court 
for further order. State law could prohibit other parties from entering into 
 
 180 Once contempt has been established, a district court has “broad discretion to fashion an 
appropriate coercive remedy . . . based on the nature of the harm and the probable effect of alternative 
sanctions.” EEOC v. Local 28, 247 F.3d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting N.A. Sales Co. v. Chapman 
Industries Corp., 736 F.2d 854, 857 (2d Cir. 1984)). 
 181 Certain cryptoasset systems, like Zcash, Monero, Beam, and Grin include native features that 
provide additional transactional privacy for their users. This additional transactional privacy 
complicates tracing of these assets. Some cryptoasset users intentionally obscure their transactions by 
using protocols that provide additional privacy, like coinjoin, or services like mixers or tumblers that 
commingle transactions to provide additional privacy. Tokenized versions of securities are distinct from 
these assets as lost securities may be replaced by the issuer, and issuers of tokenized securities will 
typically respond to valid court process. Those asset types and transaction types are excluded from the 
analysis and proposals suggested herein. 
 182 Although best practices suggest never reusing public keys, and new public keys can be 
generated for each transaction by hierarchical deterministic wallets, no wallet software mandates this 
practice and it is foreseeable that sloppy users may reuse public keys. See generally Address reuse, 
BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Address_reuse [https://perma.cc/W4UL-2KGA]. 
 183 All transaction outputs are identifiable. Identifiable unspent transaction outputs, called 
“UTXOs,” are increments of Bitcoin value that have not yet been spent by their holder. See generally 
Unspent Transaction Output, UTXO, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/glossary/unspent-transaction-
output [https://perma.cc/NKJ3-ND2E]. 
 184 See, e.g., Welcome to the Florida Secured Transaction Registry, FLORIDA SECURED 
TRANSACTION REGISTRY, https://www.floridaucc.com/uccweb/ [https://perma.cc/Q4RJ-96KF]. 
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transactions including Listed Cryptoassets185 and impose criminal penalties 
for violations.186 
This strategy would require state by state legislative enactment. State 
regulated money services businesses may claim that referencing multiple 
lists of transaction outputs and public key addresses before permitting a 
customer transaction is unduly burdensome. However, comparing 
transaction public key addresses or transaction outcomes would be a simple 
task for a smart contract, which reduces the prospective burden on 
regulated intermediaries.187 Alternatively, this registry could be created at 
the federal level by legislation that requires compliance by all 
intermediaries registered with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 
which would centralize the Listed Cryptoassets into a single list. 
Advocates for the censorship-free use of cryptocurrencies will likely 
read this proposal as antithetical to the purpose of cryptocurrency. 
However, neither the Nakamoto whitepaper nor the cypherpunk 
manifesto188 suggest that violation of the law for personal gain is a core 
value or motivation underlying the creation of cryptocurrencies. 
K. Use BSA-created Infrastructure 
Alternatively, courts could impose a lien on Listed Cryptoassets by 
creating a list that would be regularly circulated using the infrastructure 
created by the Bank Secrecy Act189 in a manner similar to the Office of 
Foreign Asset Control’s (OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals and 
Blocked Persons list (SDN),190 which precludes regulated entities from 
engaging in transactions of value, including cryptoassets,191 from listed 
public addresses, including cryptoasset public key addresses.192 
 
 185 The same “blacklisted” Listed Cryptoassets Registry could be mandated to be added as a 
screening criterion at the wallet level. 
 186 States could also amend their statutes criminalizing transactions in stolen property to include 
Listed Cryptoassets found on that state’s LCR. 
 187 Polymath, for example, uses smart contracts that restrict transactions at the token level by 
referencing whitelists that determine whether a transaction is permitted. See generally Pablo Ruiz, 
Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Restricting Token Transfers But Were Afraid to Ask, 
POLYMATHNETWORK (June 7, 2018), https://blog.polymath.network/all-you-ever-wanted-to-know-
about-restricting-token-transfers-827009d649b7 [https://perma.cc/7EFH-E6M2]. 
 188 Eric Hughes, A Cypherpunk Manifesto, ACTIVISM.NET (Mar. 9, 1993), 
https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html [https://perma.cc/B7RY-KPY2]. 
 189 See generally 31 U.S.C.§ 310 (2012) et seq. 
 190 See generally Specially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons List (SDN) Human 
Readable Lists, DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/sdn-
list/pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/T4MZ-RMEW]. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Andrew Hinkes & Joe Ciccolo, OFAC’s Bitcoin Blacklist Could Change Crypto, COINDESK 
(Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/goodbye-fungibility-ofacs-bitcoin-blacklist-remake-crypto 
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However, OFAC’s SDN list was created due to national security 
concerns, and enforcement of turnover orders are unlikely to qualify as 
national security issues.193 Likewise, the SDN list is only updated on a 
monthly basis, which is unlikely to be sufficient given the speed at which 
cryptoassets travel. 
L. Modify Existing State Law Writs of Attachment 
Alternatively, courts could issue modified writs of attachment that 
would direct state regulated money services businesses to freeze or seize 
transactions including Listed Cryptoassets. Procedurally, the proponent of 
contempt would be required to serve the writ upon the various 
intermediaries who may be asked to facilitate transactions including Listed 
Cryptoassets. This approach would burden parties to identify and 
individually serve each regulated intermediary which may potentially 
facilitate transfers of Listed Cryptoassets. Legislation could require state 
regulators to maintain a public list of contact information for regulated 
intermediaries for service of process, or to create a central “hub” that would 
permit streamlined service of process upon a single entity that would 
qualify as service upon all state-registered intermediaries. The 
contemplated writ would require the regulated entities to serve a response 
that would indicate if the intermediary has processed any transactions 
including the Listed Cryptoassets, to provide information related to those 
transactions, to seize any transactions including the Listed Cryptoassets, 
and to update the court with additional replies if they seize any transactions 
including those Listed Cryptoassets. When a regulated intermediary reports 
that they have frozen or seized a Listed Cryptoasset, the court could order 
that intermediary to transact those cryptoassets to the proponent of the 
contempt, and the court would by order remove that asset from the LCR, 
functionally removing the “mark” from those assets, and permitting the 
 
[https://perma.cc/VLS2-LDD9] (“What happens if you receive a transaction from a listed digital 
currency address? It is possible that the received coins would then be ‘tainted’ as being linked back to a 
listed individual or entity, and that your identity and digital currency address may then be added to the 
OFAC list.”); OFAC FAQs: Sanctions Compliance, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_compliance.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/N975-LXED]. 
 193 Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/
about/organizational-structure/offices/pages/office-of-foreign-assets-control.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/A3VQ-FT2L] (“The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department 
of the Treasury administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and 
national security goals against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics 
traffickers, those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 
other threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States.”). 
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party receiving those cryptoassets to take them free and clear of any cloud 
on title.194 
Each of the above proposals would have the effect of “marking” those 
transaction outcomes or assets held by designated public key addresses so 
that they are distinct from other similar assets. This would practically 
destroy the fungibility of those assets and make those marked assets less 
useful, less marketable, and likely less valuable. Subsequent purchasers of 
those assets or lenders offered those assets as collateral would reject those 
transactions as a result of the lien. 
Of course, this lien or “marking” system would potentially implicate 
the rights of third parties who may receive those assets as part of an arms-
length transaction and who would believe that they are bona fide 
purchasers of those cryptoassets. The law enacted to create the lien could 
provide for the purported owner, recipient of the seized cryptoassets, or 
both to receive notice and an opportunity to contest the seizure prior to the 
turnover of those assets. These priority contests would be handled by courts 
like other lien priority matters. 
This new approach to contempt strikes an elegant balance. It does not 
harm a contemnor who actually lost her private key, because the 
cryptoassets associated with a lost private key will not be transacted and 
therefore marking them, and by so doing destroying their fungibility, 
causes no harm. Barring unforeseen technical innovation, those assets will 
forever remain illiquid and un-negotiable. However, this approach may 
allow a party to recover cryptoassets transacted by a thief or hacker using a 
stolen private key, and may result in the identification of the hacker or 
thief. Likewise, marking or imposing a lien on cryptoassets would harm a 
lying contemnor who intends to profit from the secreted assets by 
significantly impairing their value and transactability. This strategy also 
potentially allows a court to catch a lying contemnor violating the turnover 
order. All of these factors disincentive future contemnors from tactically 
claiming private key loss and “waiting out” an incarceration sanction with 
the expectation that valuable assets will be available upon release.195 
Finally, this sanction may allow the proponent of contempt to recover 
cryptoassets regardless of the contemnor’s cooperation. 
Unlike typical contempt sanctions, these new strategies do not seek to 
compel the contemnor to take some action to comply with the turnover 
 
 194 See, for example, 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012), which allows property to be sold “free and clear” 
of other property interests under specific conditions.   
 195 There would likely emerge a “black market” for these encumbered cryptoassets; reducing 
fungibility may drive these assets out of the system of regulated intermediaries, or out of the United 
States’ jurisdiction. 
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order; as a result they may be preferable to coercive imprisonment of the 
contemnor on policy grounds as well.196 Although these new strategies 
could be viewed as independent remedies, they are consistent with typical 
civil contempt remedies as they directly benefit the opposing party and 
seek to effectuate the court’s orders.197 
CONCLUSION 
Cryptoassets are now commonly held and are marketed to integrate 
with, and in some instances, to replace traditional financial products. As 
these assets approach ubiquity, parties in litigation and courts will be 
challenged to exercise power over cryptoassets. Given that actual control of 
considerable wealth frequently exists as ephemeral and easily 
communicated data, recalcitrant parties may be incentivized to hide, 
through omission or non-disclosure, the credentials needed to access that 
value, and may conveniently claim to have lost private keys. These 
contemnors may be willing to “wait out” a contempt sanction after resisting 
an order that requires disclosure or the use of private keys to execute a 
transaction if they know that their cryptoassets will be available to them 
after their inevitable release. 
Courts have wide latitude to fashion remedies for contempt, provided 
that, in the civil context, those remedies are not punitive and are intended to 
coerce compliance. However, where bearer forms of data is equivalent to 
value and there are a variety of means to communicate that data to third 
parties, even the drastic sanctions of open-ended incarceration with full 
surveillance of all communications suggested in this article may be 
insufficient to coerce a truly motivated contemnor to comply with a 
turnover order, or to prevent that contemnor from violating the order. 
Instead, parties and courts should enter proscriptive disclosure injunctions 
that require backups of private keys to be made and retained, which would 
both reduce the likelihood of tactical claims of lost private keys and 
provide the legal predicate for severe sanctions for noncompliance or 
subsequent loss. Courts should also look to new types of sanctions that 
leverage the capabilities of cryptoasset systems, including new laws that 
can compel regulated intermediaries to lien, identify and seize transfers of 
implicated cryptoassets. Maybe, if courts act directly against the 
cryptoassets at issue, they may not need to imprison contemnors at all; 
 
 196 The Coercive Function of Civil Contempt, supra note 143, at 129 (“[W]hen a complainant can 
effectively proceed by ordinary attachment or garnishment proceedings, policy dictates that the coercive 
remedy should not be available.”). 
 197 Grote, supra note 73, at 1256. 
16:225 (2019) Throw Away the Key, or the Key Holder? 
263 







































NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
264 
 
 
